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We live in an era of populism, characterized by political polarization, 
inciting speech on social media, and an escalation in hate crimes. The 
regulatory framework for direct incitement to imminent lawless action 
established fifty years ago in Brandenburg is showing signs of severe strain. 
One of the central frailties of Brandenburg’s three-part test is the lack of 
guidance on how courts should evaluate the probability that an inciting 
speech act will cause an imminent offense. In the absence of clear direction 
on analyzing risk, judges often rely on outdated heuristics and misleading 
metaphors. This article is the first to draw on behavioral research to 
construct a systematic evidence-based framework for assessing the likelihood 
that inciting speech will result in imminent lawless action. This matrix is then 
applied to the fact pattern in Sines v. Kessler, a civil suit arising from the 
events in Charlottesville, Virginia in 2017.   
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“[W]hen a speaker incites a crowd to violence, his incitement 
does not receive constitutional protection.” 




We live in an era of populist politics that is characterized by intense 
emotional attributions of blame to elites,1 and an increase in political 
communication that emphasizes threat, anger, and fear.2 While populism is 
 
1 See Nadia Urbinati, Political Theory of Populism, 22 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 111, 119 (2019) 
(discussing the role of anti-elite populism in recent political elections).  
2 See Michael Hameleers, Linda Bos & Claes H. de Vreese, “They Did It”: The Effects of 
Emotionalized Blame Attribution in Populist Communication, 44 COMM. RES. 870, 871-72 
(2017) (analyzing how anger, fear, and emotions as used in populist communication affect 
different groups of people). 
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time-honored, what is new about the current wave of populism is the degree 
to which polarizing and caustic messages are amplified daily on social media 
platforms that moderate the content of online speech under a First 
Amendment framework.3 Vigorous political communication, even that which 
is offensive and reprehensible to some, is protected by the First Amendment 
and much political speech can be met with a variety of non-censorial 
measures such as counterspeech.4  
However, a segment of political speech may constitute incitement to 
imminent physical attacks on political opponents or particular social groups.5 
Since “[t]he First Amendment does not protect violence,”6 incitement is not 
constitutionally protected,7 and implies a framework of regulation. The thesis 
advanced here is that our current legal system is ill-equipped to deal with 
inciting speech because it does not possess a systematic framework to 
evaluate which speech causes the greatest risk of imminent violence. 
One corollary of current populist politics in the United States since 
2016 has been an increase in bias-motivated crimes against persons or 
property. The 2016 presidential election occurred against the backdrop of one 
of the largest recorded increases in hate crimes8 in U.S. history, second only 
 
3 See generally Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes 
Governing Online Speech, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1599 (2018) (explaining how social media 
companies’ content moderation policies are shaped by the First Amendment). 
4 See NADINE STROSSEN, HATE: WHY WE SHOULD RESIST IT WITH FREE SPEECH, NOT 
CENSORSHIP 158 (2018) (discussing the importance of counterspeech as a response to hate speech). 
5 See Marc Rohr, Grand Illusion? The Brandenburg Test and Speech that Encourages or 
Facilitates Criminal Acts, 38 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1, 14 (2002) (explaining the imprecision 
of the Brandenburg test, which is intended to articulate the limits of freedom of speech); 
Alexander Tsesis, Inflammatory Speech: Offense Versus Incitement, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1145, 
1145-49 (2010) (distinguishing offensive speech from incitement); Leslie Kendrick, Note, A 
Test for Criminally Instructional Speech, 91 VA. L. REV. 1973, 1987-88 (2005) (discussing 
the role of imminence in differentiating between criminal instructive speech, incitement, and 
political advocacy). But see Eugene Volokh, Crime-Facilitating Speech, 57 STAN. L. REV. 
1095, 1103-06 (2005) (analyzing speech that facilitates the actual commission of crimes). 
See generally Steven Gey, The Brandenburg Paradigm and Other First Amendments, 12 U. 
PA. J. CONST. L. 971 (2010) (examining the applicability of the Brandenburg paradigm to 
nonpolitical speech).  
6 NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 916 (1982). 
7 “Speech that falls within th[e] category of incitement is not entitled to First Amendment 
protection.” James v. Meow Media, Inc., 300 F.3d 683, 698 (6th Cir. 2002) (considering 
negligence claims against producers of violent video games and movies). An inciter is a 
person who “counsels, commands or advises the commission of a crime,” according to 
GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW 612 (2d ed. 1962). 
8 The Hate Crime Statistics Act, 34 U.S.C. § 41305 (2018) defines hate crimes as “crimes 
that manifest evidence of prejudice based on race, gender or gender identity, religion, 
disability, sexual orientation, or ethnicity.” The Bureau of Statistics’ National Crime 
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to the upsurge after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.9 In 2016, the 
nation’s law enforcement agencies10 reported 6121 single-bias incidents of 
hate crimes involving 7509 victims, an increase of 5% in the number of 
victims, even as overall crime decreased.11 In 2017, the trajectory of hate 
crimes continued to climb steeply, and agencies reported 7106 single-bias 
incidents, an increase of 17% on the year before.12 Of note in 2017 was the 
31% rise in hate crimes committed on the basis of religious animus, primarily 
against Jews and Muslims.13 
Social media is often identified as a contributing factor for much that 
ails modern society, including political polarization, but the mere fact that so 
much political discourse occurs online has allowed researchers to analyze 
more precisely than before the relationship between online speech and offline 
hate crimes. Their findings have been sobering.14 For instance, Müller and 
Schwarz identify a statistically significant correlation between anti-
 
Victimization Survey (NCVS) classifies a crime as a hate crime when the victim reports “at 
least one of three types of evidence that the act was motivated by hate: (1) the offender used 
hate language, (2) the offender left behind hate symbols, or (3) police investigators confirmed 
that the incident was hate crime.” Hate Crime, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=37 [https://perma.cc/P833-J35U] (last 
visited Jan. 28, 2019). 
9 See Griffin Edwards & Stephen Rushin, The Effect of President Trump's Election on Hate 
Crimes 6-7 (Jan. 18, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3102652 
[https://perma.cc/WW6G-YL6K] (analyzing the effects of political speech during the U.S. 
presidential elections). 
10 Hate crimes are underreported by law enforcement agencies, and economists find evidence 
for as many as 50,000 hate crimes a year in the United States. See Dhammika Dharmapala 
& Richard H. McAdams, Words That Kill? An Economic Model of the Influence of Speech 
on Behavior (with Particular Reference to Hate Speech), 34 J. LEGAL STUDS. 93, 94 n.3 
(2005) (noting the difference between statistics published by the FBI and the Southern 
Poverty Law Center, which estimates there are 50,000 hate crimes annually).  
11 CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFO. SERV. DIV., FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME 
REPORT, HATE CRIMES STATISTICS, INCIDENTS & OFFENSES 1-2 (2016) [hereinafter 2016 
UNIFORM CRIME REPORT]. 
12 Id.; CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFO. SERV. DIV., FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM 
CRIME REPORT, HATE CRIMES STATISTICS, INCIDENTS & OFFENSES 1-2 (2017) [hereinafter 
2017 UNIFORM CRIME REPORT]. 
13 In 2016, the FBI reported 1,538 religious bias incidents and in 2017, it reported 1,679. 2016 
UNIFORM CRIME REPORT, supra note 11; 2017 UNIFORM CRIME REPORT, supra note 12. 
14 See generally Karsten Müller & Carlo Schwarz, Fanning the Flames of Hate: Social Media 
and Hate Crime (Feb. 19, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract= 3082972 
[https://perma.cc/RY4Z-ZLBS] (comparing the context of online hate speech in Germany and 
the USA in 2016 & 2017); Jonathan Rothwell & Pablo Diego-Rosell, Explaining Nationalist 
Political Views (Nov. 2, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. 
cfm?abstract_id=2822059 [https://perma.cc/UZ57-HKAC] (examining support for nationalist 
policies and racial resentment); Edwards & Rushin, supra note 9. 
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immigrant as well as anti-Muslim tweets and actual attacks on Muslims and 
immigrants in 2016.15 The unprecedented conjuncture of populism and social 
media has created new challenges for the regulation of incitement and 
problematic internet content more broadly,16 given that the present legal 
regime was designed in the 1960s, during the epoch of television, mass-
circulation newspaper, and leaflets passed out by hand on the urban street-corner.  
We can identify these new challenges in incitement cases currently 
winding their way through the U.S. courts.17 One illuminating case is Sines 
v. Kessler, a civil suit filed in the aftermath of the events in Charlottesville, 
Virginia, on August 11 and 12, 2017.18 The case relies on the defendants’ 
speech on Discord, an “invitation only” social media platform, in the days 
before the violence in which a protestor was killed.19 Through posts on the 
web platform, the defendants planned and coordinated the march of white 
nationalists and white supremacists in Charlottesville, provided videos on 
fighting techniques, and urged marchers to bring weapons such as 
semiautomatic rifles, handguns and knives.20 Most significantly, the 
defendants encouraged unlawful acts of violence, posting explicit calls for 
 
15 Karsten Müller & Carlo Schwarz, From Hashtag to Hate Crime: Twitter and Anti-Minority 
Sentiment 25-28 (Nov. 2, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3149103 [https://perma.cc/TDY2-86F4]. 
16 See, e.g., Nina I. Brown & Jonathan Peters, Say This, Not That: Government Regulation 
and Control of Social Media, 68 SYRACUSE L. REV. 521, 527 (2018) (arguing that there is 
little the federal government can do regarding content posted on social media); Danielle 
Keats Citron & Benjamin Wittes, The Internet Will Not Break: Denying Bad Samaritans § 
230 Immunity, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 401, 454 (2017) (noting that “efforts to 
hold social media companies responsible under the civil provisions of the federal material-
support statute have consistently failed”); Gill Grassie, The Campaign Against Hate Crime 
Online—Can Lessons Be Learned from the IP Takedown Experience to Date?, 21 J. 
INTERNET L. 3, 3 (2017) (discussing government efforts to regulate social media companies 
with respect to racist or defamatory content); James Grimmelmann, The Virtues of 
Moderation, 17 YALE J.L. & TECH. 42, 55-76 (2015) (providing a taxonomy of moderation in 
online communities); Klonick, supra note 3, at 1635 (examining how content is moderated 
ex ante vs. ex post); Kyle Langvardt, Regulating Online Content Moderation, 106 GEO. L.J. 
1353, 1357 (2018) (considering different policies on content moderation); Alexander 
Tsesis, Social Media Accountability for Terrorist Propaganda, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 605, 
628 (2017) (discussing how Congress should look to international legislative models when 
drafting material-support statutes). 
17 See, e.g., Sines v. Kessler, 324 F. Supp. 3d 765 (W.D. Va. 2018) (alleging white 
supremacists conspired to commit racial violence and asking whether the defendants’ 
incitement laden social media posts violated Virginia’s hate crimes statute); Gersh v. Anglin, 
353 F. Supp. 3d 958 (D. Mont. 2018) (seeking punitive damages for the defendant’s inciting 
and threatening posts against a Jewish woman on the Daily Stormer website). 
18 Sines, 324 F. Supp. 3d at 765. 
19 Id. at 776, 779. 
20 Id. at 776, 804-05. 
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violence against protestors and making approving remarks about running 
over protestors with a vehicle, which in fact occurred.21  
On the basis of the march organizers’ social media posts, the U.S. 
District Court for the Western District of Virginia has confirmed the injuries 
suffered by the protestors were “reasonably foreseeable”22 in advance. This 
raises the question, could they have been prevented if there had been an 
adequate risk assessment prior to the march? Answering requires that we 
delve more deeply into Brandenburg, the constitutional precedent on 
incitement.23 In Brandenburg, a 1969 case concerning a Ku Klux Klan leader 
from Ohio, the U.S. Supreme Court established the precedent that speech 
could not be suppressed unless it was “directed to inciting or producing 
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.”24 
Brandenburg’s three-part test abjures the suppression of mere advocacy of an 
offense, and requires that the speaker (1) intended for a crime to be committed 
and advocated an offense that is both (2) imminent and (3) likely to occur.25  
While subsequent jurisprudence has gone some way to spelling out 
the meaning of the “advocacy” and “imminence” elements, courts have 
provided very little direction regarding how likely a crime must be, and what 
criteria should be utilized in risk analysis. Incitement law therefore demands 
that courts assess the risks accompanying hazardous public utterances but 
has, thus far, not furnished the necessary tools to assess those risks. 
Brandenburg’s lack of precision on the imminence and likelihood prongs 
hinders its responsiveness to a resurgence of discriminatory animus in 
political discourse. We are in a similar moment to the mid-2000s, when some 
legal scholars claimed that the “War on Terror” had stretched Brandenburg 
to its breaking point in cases involving post-9/11 terrorist propagandists.26 
This Article is the first to draw on recent behavioral research on 
persuasion, political communication, and dehumanizing speech to create a 
rigorous and empirically-tested framework to guide legal actors as they assess 
the probability that speech will culminate in imminent lawless action. Given 
the uncertainty surrounding the imminence and likelihood elements of 
incitement doctrine and the widespread occurrence of bias-motivated crimes, 
 
21 Id. at 796. 
22 Id. at 797. 
23 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam). 
24 Id. at 447. 
25 Id. 
26 See generally Laura K. Donohue, Terrorist Speech and the Future of Free Expression, 27 
CARDOZO L. REV. 233, 240 (2005) (discussing the implications of terrorist speech on free 
speech norms, and the strength of Brandenburg as a matter of precedent); Thomas Healy, 
Brandenburg in a Time of Terror, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 655 (2009) (examining the 
continuing strength of Brandenburg in an age of political jihadism). 
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it is a propitious time to turn to behavioral research for guidance on the types 
of speech and contexts that are most likely to end in violent confrontations.  
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I provides background on 
incitement in the twentieth century and how the “bad tendency” and “clear 
and present danger” tests were excessively restrictive of political speech, and 
neither could operationalize elements of imminence and the context of 
utterances. Part II considers Brandenburg’s test for incitement and parses the 
three elements, observing that direct advocacy has received the lion’s share 
of the attention of courts, while imminence and probability have received 
short shrift. Part III develops an original critique of current incitement 
jurisprudence, observing how judges are prone to rely on personal hunches, 
heuristics, and common metaphors to describe the likely causal effects of 
speech. Part IV offers a solution to the current challenge of uninformed risk 
assessment of speech by distilling the settled social science research on 
inciting speech to identify ten primary factors, which, if present, provide for 
joint sufficiency and indicate an elevated risk for imminent lawless action. 
There are compelling reasons to revisit incitement law at our current 
political juncture. Along with conspiracy and attempt, incitement is one of 
the few offenses in criminal law that is an inchoate crime. Where the 
probability is high that crimes will ensue, the speech advocating a crime is 
already a punishable act, and law enforcement agencies need not wait for a 
deleterious chain of events to unfold before they act.27 Incitement is a crime 
of prevention and deterrence, but incitement law requires reform to better 
fulfill its purpose of protecting citizens, and especially some of our most 
vulnerable citizens, from imminent harm and injury.  
 
I. “EVERY IDEA IS AN INCITEMENT”: REPRESSIVE JURISPRUDENCE 
PRE-BRANDENBURG 
 
A. The Context of Speech 
 
Since the history of incitement law in the early-mid twentieth 
century is well-rehearsed, this Section focuses particularly on one strand 
of that narrative; the unsuccessful effort to shift the constitutional emphasis 
from the content of speech to the context of inciting speech, and in 
particular to the elements of imminence and probability.  
 
27 As described in United States v. White,  
In the case of a criminal solicitation, the speech—asking another to commit 
a crime—is the punishable act. Solicitation is an inchoate crime; the crime 
is complete once the words are spoken with the requisite intent, and no 
further actions from either the solicitor or the solicitee are necessary. 
610 F.3d 956, 960 (7th Cir. 2010). 
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In the midst of Civil Rights marches, anti-Vietnam war protests and 
widespread social upheaval, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that political 
advocacy could no longer be banned on the basis of “mere advocacy” alone.28 
Courts are required to assess the probability that a crime is imminent, an activity 
that implies an assessment of context.29 Risk analysis is therefore at the heart of 
contemporary First Amendment jurisprudence, but it took fifty years for this 
idea, originally advanced by Justice Holmes in Schenck, to be accepted.30 Even 
after it was formally endorsed, courts have proved neither adept nor eager to 
conduct a risk analysis of inciting speech, an inherently difficult and contentious 
exercise that implies provisional predictions about future behavior. Importantly, 
courts have not been willing to set out the risk analysis criteria they use to 
determine whether the crime being advocated is imminent or likely.  
For most of our country’s history, the U.S. federal government and state 
governments31 prohibited speech considered a threat to government authority or 
public order, including speech that simply criticized individual office holders.32 
The legal doctrines of criminal libel, blasphemy and out-of-chamber contempt of 
the courts and legislatures were all inherited from the monarchical system of 
Great Britain, and epitomized what Phillip Blumberg accurately terms the 
“repressive jurisprudence” of the early American Republic.33  
Severe restrictions on political speech were unwound between the mid-
1930s and the early 1950s as the U.S. Supreme Court swept away blasphemy,34 
 
28 Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 449. 
29 Id. at 447. 
30 In 1969, Brandenburg upheld the principle of risk analysis, understood as the evaluation 
of the likelihood that advocacy of a crime will result in imminent lawless action. Id. In his 
opinion fifty years earlier in Schenck, Holmes opined that,  
The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such 
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present 
danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a 
right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree. 
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). The call to review the circumstances as 
well as the proximity and degree of speech represents an instruction to courts to engage in 
risk analysis, and People v. Rubin, 96 Cal. App. 3d 968, 979 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979), understood 
“degree” as the risk-assessing “likelihood of producing such action.” 
31 See, e.g., PHILLIP BLUMBERG, REPRESSIVE JURISPRUDENCE IN THE EARLY AMERICAN 
REPUBLIC: THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE LEGACY OF ENGLISH LAW 337 (2010) 
(describing the statutes in Southern states in the early-mid 1800s suppressing abolitionist 
speech, as well as a House of Representatives rule with the same effect). 
32 Id. at 3-6 (describing the early years of the American republic and the consequences of the 
1798 Sedition Act). See generally John F. Wirenius, The Road to Brandenburg: A Look at 
the Evolving Understanding of the First Amendment, 43 DRAKE L. REV. 1 (1994) (reciting 
the history of First Amendment jurisprudence up into the twentieth century). 
33 BLUMBERG, supra note 31, at 1. 
34 Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 506 (1952). 
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contempt of court for out-of-court speech,35 and criminal and civil libel involving 
public persons.36 Incitement was one of the last elements of the regime of 
repressive First Amendment jurisprudence inherited from English common law to 
be liberalized. Each loosening of the restrictions on political speech incrementally 
elevated the status of context, including the circumstances of speech and the risk 
that it would imminently result in a crime. 
 
B. Bad Tendencies 
 
Until the end of the First World War, the mere tendency of speech 
to encourage unlawful acts was sufficient basis to warrant its suppression, 
no matter how remote the risk that the offense advocated would actually 
occur.37 For example, the indictment in Pierce v. United States asked not 
whether the low-circulation pamphlet could undercut a national program 
of war conscription, but simply whether “the statements contained in the 
pamphlet were not such as would naturally produce the forbidden 
consequences.”38  
In 1919, antiwar protestors were jailed under the “bad tendency” 
standard in Debs v. United States and Frohwerk v. United States, with Debs 
stating that the jury “could not find the defendant guilty for advocacy of any 
of his opinions unless the words used had as their natural tendency and 
reasonably probable effect to obstruct the recruiting service . . . .”39 Even a 
tendency to produce an outcome that was not in itself an offense could be 
sufficient to warrant criminal censure.40  
 
35 Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33, 42 (1941); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 271 (1941). 
36 See generally New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (applying a new 
actual malice standard to a civil libel case involving Martin Luther King, Jr.); Garrison v. 
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964) (analyzing the applicability of a criminal libel statute in the 
context of allegedly disparaging remarks made by a prosecutor about local judges). 
37 See generally KENT GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE 221-22 
(1989) (laying out the bad tendency doctrine); Rodney A. Smolla, Should the Brandenburg 
v. Ohio Incitement Test Apply in Media Violence Cases? 27 N. KY. L. REV. 1 (2000) 
(applying the Brandenberg defense to a series of media violence hypotheticals); Wirenius, 
supra note 32, at 17 n.103 (summarizing early twentieth-century developments in the 
caselaw); Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Book Review, 62 HARV. L. REV. 891, 901 (1949) (reviewing 
ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948)). 
38 Pierce v. United States, 252 U.S. 239, 243-44 (1920). 
39 Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 216 (1919); see also Frohwerk v. United States, 249 
U.S. 204, 209 (1919) (observing that “it is impossible to say that it might not have been found 
that the circulation of the paper was in quarters where a little breath would be enough to 
kindle a flame”). 
40 Fox v. Washington, 236 U.S. 273, 275 (1915). Fox upheld a Washington statute preventing 
the printing and circulation of written matter “which shall tend to encourage or advocate 
disrespect for law or for any court or courts of justice,” even though “disrespect for the law” 
was not a crime at the time. Id.  
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The “bad tendency” standard was formally repudiated in First 
Amendment jurisprudence in 1919,41 but its ghost still haunts modern municipal 
and state ordinances.42 Here, it is worth observing that First Amendment 
jurisprudence remains perpetually untidy, even as standards are gradually 
liberalized.43 Standards emphatically renounced in one constitutional moment 
can resurface decades later at the municipal and state level. 
With the entry of the United States into the First World War and the 
passage of the Espionage Act of 1917,44 a more flexible standard was needed to 
protect political dissent, while acknowledging that the government might 
legitimately restrict speech that undermined the war effort. Any dissenting 
speech could conceivably stir up a tendency to law-breaking, and what was 
additionally required was an assessment of risk that weighed the gravity and 
proximity of the crime being urged.  
 
C. Repressing Political Dissent: Clear and Present Danger 
 
Schenck v. United States and Abrams v. United States, both decided in 
1919, announced a new test for criminal advocacy and are widely considered the 
fons et origo of modern jurisprudence on incitement and the First Amendment.45 
In Schenck, the defendants were convicted of violations of the Espionage Act for 
printing and circulating an antiwar leaflet to men who had been called up for 
military service.46 Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes replaced the overly capacious 
“bad tendency” standard with the ostensibly more stringent “clear and present 
danger test,” 47 which he articulated as: 
 
41 See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 253 (2002) (“[T]he mere tendency 
of speech to encourage unlawful acts is not a sufficient reason for banning it.”). 
42 See Bible Believers v. Wayne Cty., Mich., 805 F.3d 228, 237 (6th Cir. 2015) (describing 
criminal accountability under state law and local ordinances “for conduct which has the 
tendency to incite riotous behavior or otherwise disturb the peace”). 
43 Gey, supra note 5, at 971 (discussing the “fracturing” of First Amendment law). 
44 See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 533-34 (1951) (providing a review of Espionage 
Act cases). 
45 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 627 (1919); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 
47 (1919); see, e.g., DANIEL FARBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 67-68 (4th ed. 2014) (asserting 
that the Schenck and Abrams decisions in 1919 represented “one of the great turning points 
in the development of First Amendment Doctrine”); Healy, supra note 26, at 711 (observing 
how Brandenburg’s application of strict scrutiny of advocacy has its origins in Schenck); 
Tsesis, Inflammatory Speech, supra note 5, at 1156 (describing how Schenck “established 
the groundwork for contemporary doctrine”). 
46 Schenck, 249 U.S. at 48-49. 
47 See id. at 52; see also Abrams, 250 U.S. at 627 (using the expression “clear and 
imminent danger”). 
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The question in every case is whether the words used are used 
in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a 
clear and present danger that they will bring about the 
substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a 
question of proximity and degree.48  
Despite the fact that Holmes took great pains in Schenck to add the qualifiers 
of “proximity” and “degree,” which have been parsed by courts as tests of 
imminence and likelihood,49 subsequent First Amendment cases emphasized 
advocacy and content, rather than context and immediate circumstances. 
There was no reference to gravity, proximity, or likelihood in Frohwerk, a 
fourth Espionage Act case from 1919 which instead harked back to the “bad 
tendency” standard.50 
Any consideration of “proximity” (imminence) or “degree” 
(likelihood) was also spurned in Gitlow (1925).51 In the place of a careful risk 
analysis, Gitlow conjured up metaphors of fire and conflagration:  
And the immediate danger is none the less real and substantial, 
because the effect of a given utterance cannot be accurately 
foreseen. The State cannot reasonably be required to measure 
the danger from every such utterance in the nice balance of a 
jeweler's scale. A single revolutionary spark may kindle a fire 
that, smouldering for a time, may burst into a sweeping and 
destructive conflagration.52  
The Supreme Court Justices in Gitlow stated their disdain for predictive 
forecasting: “the question whether any specific utterance coming within the 
prohibited class is likely, in and of itself, to bring about the substantive evil, 
is not open to consideration.”53 The modern reticence to engage in risk 
analysis, then, has identifiable historical antecedents. 
In rejecting predictive forecasting, incitement law slipped backwards 
into “bad tendency” territory once again in which all seditious advocacy was 
treated as an existential threat to stability and order. Justice Holmes, joined 
by Justice Brandeis, dissented from the majority’s (mis)interpretation of the 
 
48 Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52. 
49 “Proximity” could be straightforwardly read as “imminence” if we consider Holmes’s 
dissenting comment in Abrams indicating that the public expression of opinions remains 
protected speech unless the opinions “so imminently threaten immediate interference with 
the lawful and pressing purposes of the law that an immediate check is required to save the 
country.” Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630. Subsequent courts found that “degree” denoted the 
“likelihood of producing such action.” See People v. Rubin, 96 Cal. App. 3d 968, 979 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1979). 
50 Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 209 (1919).  
51 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 669 (1925). 
52 Id. 
53 Id. at 670. 
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“clear and present danger” standard that Holmes had created six years 
previously, remarking that there was no real danger that the “Left Wing 
Manifesto” published by the defendant would culminate in the overthrow of 
the government.54 Holmes and Brandeis memorably protested the overly 
inclusive application of incitement law to a low-circulation and insignificant 
socialist pamphlet, on the grounds that under this standard, “[e]very idea is 
an incitement.”55  
After the Second World War, Red Scare legislation such as the Smith 
Act strictly curtailed political speech.56 In 1951, Dennis v. United States, a 
watershed case in which the Supreme Court reviewed the Smith Act, held that 
the overall threat of communist revolution was a “sufficient evil”57 that 
unshackled the courts from restraining criteria of probability or immediacy: “The 
damage which such attempts create both physically and politically to a nation 
makes it impossible to measure the validity in terms of the probability of success, 
or the immediacy of a successful attempt.”58 By Dennis, the “clear and present 
danger” standard had become so enfeebled that it provided little protection from 
Red Scare mania,59 and permitted convictions for merely reading and discussing 
books by Stalin, Marx and Engels, and Lenin.60  
Dennis was riven with sharp disagreement, and Justice Douglas wrote 
an angrily worded dissent61 which held that there is a “wide difference”62 
between advocacy and incitement, and observed that communists in America are 
“miserable merchants of unwanted ideas; their wares remain unsold.”63 
Imminence64 and probability—in short, risk analysis—constituted Douglas’s 
answer to the majority’s unwarranted suppression of a marginal political doctrine 
that patently lacked the resources to mount an existential challenge. Probability 
is at the heart of the question of whether advocacy of a crime constitutes 
incitement; namely the probability that an incitement to lawbreaking sufficiently 
enhances the chances that a violation will occur.65 But what is sufficient? 
 
54 Id. at 655. 
55 Id. at 673 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
56 Alien Registration Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-670, 54 Stat. 670; see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 
2385 (2018) (criminalizing activity which could be construed as supporting “overthrowing 
or destroying the government of the United States” or any state governments). 
57 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 509 (1951). 
58 Id. 
59 See generally ELLEN SCHRECKER, MANY ARE THE CRIMES: MCCARTHYISM IN AMERICA 
(1999) (discussing the Red Scare and the impact of McCarthyism). 
60 Dennis, 341 U.S. at 582 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
61 Id. at 579. 
62 Id. at 586. 
63 Id. at 589. 
64 Id. at 585. 
65 Id. 
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D. Free Speech in the Early Civil Rights Era  
 
By 1957, McCarthyism was a spent political force and Justice 
Douglas’ plea for a more contextual approach to incitement began to gain 
traction. In that year, Yates v. United States reversed the convictions of 
communist party officials under the Smith Act and affirmed that speakers 
could not be punished merely for advocating seditious political beliefs.66 
Yates drew a sharp line between abstract advocacy that was protected 
speech and incitement to illegal action that was unprotected.67  
Noto v. United States, decided during the tumult of the Civil Rights 
era, demanded narrower criteria for incitement, reversing the conviction of 
a communist activist convicted under the Smith Act for advocating the 
overthrow of the government.68 Noto raised the actus reus threshold of 
incitement to include imminence. Advocacy of crimes, such as sabotage to 
achieve a revolutionary moment, must represent “present advocacy,”69 not 
just urge revolution in a remote future. Advocacy of rebellion was 
insufficient, and there had to be some chance that the incitement would 
achieve the undesirable result.70 Noto was the stepping stone to 
Brandenburg and signified the turning point when requirements of 
proximity and likelihood became part of the consensus opinion.  
To summarize: before Brandenburg, government regulation of 
speech was frequently oppressive and served to preserve state interests. 
During two World Wars and one Cold War, legislators and judges 
regulated dissent that opposed conscription for war or advocated 
revolutionary socialism. That the Supreme Court lifted historic restrictions 
on speech in the cauldron of the civil rights and anti-Vietnam war era was 
not the result of a road-to-Damascus conversion of justices to the cause of 
dissent, but because the state was secure enough to tolerate seditious 
speech, given the limited ideological appeal and feeble organizational 
capacity of American socialism.71 
 
 
66 Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 318-27 (1957), overruled by Burks v. United States, 
437 U.S. 1 (1978).  
67 Id. at 318.  
68 Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961). 
69 Id. at 298. 
70 Id at 298-99. 
71 “[I]t is impossible for me to say that the Communists in this country are so potent or so 
strategically deployed that they must be suppressed for their speech.” Dennis v. United 
States, 341 U.S. 494, 589 (1951). We might also recall Holmes’s dissent in Abrams when he 
refers to the defendants as “poor and puny anonymities.” Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 
616, 629 (1919). 
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II. BRANDENBURG V. OHIO:  
CONTEXTUALIZING SPEECH AND ASSESSING RISK 
 
A. The Contours of Brandenburg 
 
Brandenburg v. Ohio, decided in 1969, announced a new standard 
that required courts to evaluate the risks of political speech and embraced 
the contextual elements presaged in Schenck, combining direct advocacy 
of a crime with an assessment that the offense will be committed 
imminently. The Brandenburg test has been settled law for five decades.72  
That said, Brandenburg is an odd decision. Barely four pages long, 
it is terse and unsigned, having been issued per curiam. It defines 
incitement with a novel three-part test that adds imminence and likelihood 
to a prior advocacy standard but provides no guidance on the three 
elements. It is contradictory in places, question-begging in others and 
gives the overall impression of being undercooked. This resulted from the 
fact that it was drafted by two authors, each with distinct objectives. 
Justice Abe Fortas commenced the initial draft but then resigned from the 
Court amidst an ethics scandal, and the judgement was revised and 
completed by Justice Brennan.73  
Scholars are frequently critical of Brandenburg, and Gey calls it 
“murky and inelegant.”74 Their criticisms are comprehensible but perhaps 
miss the point. Brandenburg only makes sense as a stealth precedent. Like 
Justice Harlan in Noto, Justice Brennan rolled out a new test covertly, all 
the while professing that the new schema was simply an extension of 
Dennis and Yates.75 Brandenburg represents, in fact, a clear break with 




72 See Gey, supra note 5, at 977 (declaring that the Brandenburg standard “is now one of the 
most well-established aspects of modern constitutional doctrine”); Tsesis, Inflammatory 
Speech, supra note 6, at 1159 (stating that Brandenburg represents “The Modern Test”). The 
Brandenburg test has been augmented by the principle that the First Amendment does not 
protect political speech or expressive conduct that materially supports foreign terrorist 
organizations. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 4 (2010).  
73 Gey, supra note 5, at 977; see also Bernard Schwartz, Justice Brennan and the 
Brandenburg Decision—A Lawgiver in Action, 79 JUDICATURE 24, 27-28 (1995) (providing 
a history and analysis of the Court’s decision in Brandenberg). 
74 Gey, supra note 5, at 977. 
75 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448, 453, 457 (1969) (per curiam) (citing Yates v. 
United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957)); see Schwartz, supra note 73 (documenting Brennan’s 
authoring of Brandenburg).  
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B. The Facts and the Test 
 
 Defendant Clarence Brandenburg was a Ku Klux Klan leader who 
invited a television crew to a farm outside Cincinnati where he addressed a 
small group of Klan members in 1964,76 the year in which the Civil Rights 
Act was passed.77 After the footage aired on Cincinnati and national 
television stations, he was prosecuted under Ohio’s antilabor syndicalism 
statute which made it illegal to advocate an offense or violence.78  
 Ohio prosecutors relied on two films taken by the television crew as 
evidence.79 In the first, twelve hooded figures carrying firearms and 
ammunition stood by a burning cross.80 The second film featured six armed 
figures wearing Klan regalia.81 According to the lower court, the defendant’s 
most inciting utterance occurred in the first film, “We’re not a revengent [sic] 
organization, but if our President, our Congress, our Supreme Court, 
continues to suppress the white, Caucasian race, it’s possible that there might 
have to be some revengeance [sic] taken.”82 Clarence Brandenburg added that 
the Klan was planning a march six days later to Congress, and, after that, to 
Florida and Mississippi.83 In the second film, he made a similar speech that 
included extreme animus and threats against Jews and African Americans.84  
Brandenburg’s conviction in a jury trial resulted in a fine of $1000 
and a sentence of one to ten years in prison,85 and the Ohio Supreme Court 
affirmed the trial verdict.86 The U.S. Supreme Court then reversed the 
conviction on the grounds that the defendant’s statements represented 
“mere abstract teaching of the moral propriety” of racism and possible 
future action against the government and others.87 Brandenburg thus 
proclaimed its new test: 
the principle that the constitutional guarantees of free 
speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or 
proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation 
except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or 
 
76 Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 444-45. 
77 The Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241. 
78 Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 444-45. 
79 Id. at 445. 
80 Id. at 445-46. 
81 Id. at 447. 
82 Id. at 446. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. at 447. 
85 Id. at 445. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. at 448-49 (citing Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 297-98 (1961)). 
Vol. 5:2] Incitement in an Era of Populism  
 
 
   
 
71 
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or 
produce such action.88 
On this basis, and citing Noto, Brandenburg held that the Ohio syndicalism 
statute violated the First Amendment because it failed to distinguish between 
“mere advocacy” and “incitement to imminent lawless action.”89  
Brandenburg’s innovation was to add two contextual conditions—
imminence and likelihood—to the long-established element of criminal 
advocacy. Brandenburg, however, provides no guidance on any of the three 
elements of the test. Advocacy was already a fundamental (if not the sole) 
element of incitement law before Brandenburg, and therefore it had already 
been the subject of extensive judicial interpretation as we just saw in the cases 
just reviewed, including Schenck, Abrams, Gitlow, Dennis, and Noto. 
Imminence was indeterminate at the time and has received only a modicum 
of elucidation since Brandenburg. Likelihood has been barely defined at all. 
Healy observes that such conceptual gaps “have been largely glossed over by 
courts and scholars.”90  
Furthermore, Brandenburg did not apply its own criteria of 
imminence and likelihood to the fact pattern in the case. It never asked 
whether the Ku Klux Klan posed a danger at the time of the cross-burning 
event, or whether the risk of violence had been elevated sufficiently by 
televising a Klan leader’s speech to a wide audience. Clarence Brandenburg’s 
televised speech included a call to march on Washington, D.C. and the 
statements, “[t]his is what we are going to do to the n-----rs,” and, “[b]ury the 
n----rs,” which were uttered next to a burning cross surrounded by hooded 
and armed Klansmen, at a time (1964) when violent clashes were a frequent 
occurrence on the streets of the United States.91 There is reason to believe 
that if the Court had applied the contextual approach it was advocating 
exactingly, then Brandenburg’s utterances may not have qualified as 
protected speech. 
Our thesis here is that the lacunae in Brandenburg, particularly with 
respect to imminence and likelihood, hinder its application to political speech 
that incites violence,92 and effectively stymie any preventative function 
 
88 Id. at 447. 
89 Id. at 448-49. Later cases have interpreted the standard in Brandenburg as requiring 
“violence or physical disorder in the nature of a riot.” White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1228 
(9th Cir. 2000) (citing Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 448, to define “imminent lawless action”). 
90 Healy, supra note 26, at 660; see also Rohr, supra note 5, at 7, 14 (discussing the 
peculiarities and ambiguities of the Brandenburg framework). 
91 Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 446 n.1. 
92 The Fourth Circuit has limited the application of Brandenburg to political speech. Rice v. 
Paladin Enterps., Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 262 (4th Cir. 1997). Not all courts, however, have 
followed this interpretation. 
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incitement law might have. The next Sections explore what subsequent courts 
have understood by advocacy, imminence, and likelihood, with special 
attention to the least developed of the three; likelihood, or probability. Since 
1969, Brandenburg has only been cited thrice by the U.S. Supreme Court: in 
Hess v. Indiana (1973), NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware (1982), and Texas v. 
Johnson (1989). The Supreme Court has not applied the decision in nearly thirty 
years, and therefore any comprehensive discussion of incitement doctrine must 
incorporate rulings by lower courts. 
 
C. The Elements of Incitement: Direct Advocacy 
 
In the United States, it is axiomatic that robust political speech, including 
that which is offensive, caustic, and even coercive is protected by the First 
Amendment.93 As Justice Stevens wrote in Claiborne, 
[s]trong and effective extemporaneous rhetoric cannot be nicely 
channeled in purely dulcet phrases. An advocate must be free to 
stimulate his audience with spontaneous and emotional appeals 
for unity and action in a common cause. When such appeals do 
not incite lawless action, they must be regarded as protected 
speech.94 
The key phrase here is “incite lawless action,” and according to the language in 
Brandenburg, political speech is protected unless it constitutes “advocacy” that 
is “directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action.”95 There is a great 
deal of guidance about what kind of speech constitutes “advocacy,” and it is 
widely recognized that the advocacy prong is the most salient of the three prongs 
of the Brandenburg test.96  
As with most crimes, incitement contains a mens rea requirement in 
which the speaker must intend to advocate a criminal offense.97 A mere tendency 
for the speech to prompt lawless action is not sufficient to remove constitutional 
protection.98 Constitutional scholars generally regard the reference to advocacy 
 
93 See, e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 910 (1982) (protecting 
coercive speech); Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707-08 (1969) (protecting robust 
criticism of, and non-true threats towards, the President); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 
376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (protecting caustic speech). 
94 Claiborne, 458 U.S. at 928. 
95 Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.  
96 See Smolla, supra note 37, at 15 (stating that advocacy/intent is the most significant of the 
three prongs of Brandenburg). 
97 MODEL PENAL CODE §2.02, §5.02 (AM. LAW INST. 1962); see Kent Greenawalt, Speech 
and Crime, 5 AM. BAR FOUND. RES. J. 645, 652 (1980) (elaborating on the requirement that 
the speaker have the purpose of inciting a crime). 
98 Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 253 (2002). 
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that is “directed to inciting or producing” as enacting an intent requirement,99 
and Chemerinsky maintains that “Brandenburg contains an intent requirement: 
the speech must be directed to causing the harm.”100 Subsequent decisions have 
made this explicit. For instance, State v. Beasley opines, “[w]hen considering the 
offense of inciting to riot, . . . the language used must clearly intend to incite a 
breach of the peace.”101 
What is repeated again and again in the post-Brandenburg era is that 
criminal advocacy in the abstract is not enough in itself to trigger a sanction.102 
Contextual evaluation has become more relevant in recent years, as courts are 
forced to adapt First Amendment law to the fast-moving advertising, internet, 
and social media environment.103 
A recent case illustrates the principle that advocacy alone is insufficient. 
In American Freedom Defense Initiative v. Metropolitan Transportation 
Authority, the court found that bus advertisements that portrayed a man whose 
head and face were mostly covered by a head scarf and a recited quote from a 
Hamas television channel, “Killing Jews is Worship that draws us close to Allah” 
and stated underneath the quote, “That’s His Jihad. What’s yours?” were 
protected by the First Amendment.104 The plaintiffs argued that the 
advertisements advocated violence, but the court countered that the target of the 
purported advocacy was not clear, and that the ads were not advocating any 
action.105 The constitutional protection afforded to abstract advocacy means that 
speech that fails to advocate any action at all cannot constitute incitement, no 
matter how repugnant or reprehensible the views advocated.106  
 
99 Gey, supra note 5, at 1021; Healy, supra note 26, at 698; Smolla, supra note 37, at 10. 
100 Erwin Chemerinsky, The Rhetoric of Constitutional Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2008, 2017 (2002). 
101 State v. Beasley, 317 So.2d 750, 753 (Fla. 1975); see also Bible Believers v. Wayne Cty., 
Mich., 805 F.3d 228, 245-46 (6th Cir. 2015) (discussing intention and advocacy). 
102 See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147-48 (1983) (stating that the determination of 
whether an employee’s speech is a matter of public concern depends on the “content, form, 
and context” of the statement); NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 927 
(1982) (reiterating that “mere advocacy of force or violence does not remove speech from 
the protection of the First Amendment”). 
103 See generally Tsesis, Social Media Accountability for Terrorist Propaganda, supra note 
16 (discussing the role of context in determining the liability of intermediaries for social 
media posts that incite terrorism). 
104 Am. Freedom Def. Initiative v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 70 F. Supp. 3d 572, 582-83 
(S.D.N.Y. 2015), vacated, 109 F.Supp.3d 626 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), aff'd, 815 F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 
2016) (vacating the decision below because the transit authority changed its polices to 
prohibit all political advertising). 
105 Id. at 582. 
106 See Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 109 (1973) (per curiam) (noting the requirement that 
the inciter advocate lawless action that is imminent); see also Bible Believers v. Wayne Cty., 
Mich., 805 F.3d 228, 245 (6th Cir. 2015) (noting that the advocacy of the Bible Believers 
group did not call for any action at all). 
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Next, it is settled First Amendment law that the suppression of speech 
cannot be content—or viewpoint—based, and any such restrictions are subject to 
strict scrutiny in which the government bears the burden of proof that the proposed 
regulation is necessary. 107 The only allowable constraints on speech are “time, 
manner[,] or place” restrictions that are content-neutral.108 The paradigmatic case 
instantiating this principle is R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minnesota. In R.A.V., 
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, reversed and remanded the conviction of a 
defendant who had been convicted for burning a cross on the lawn of an African 
American family under a city ordinance that prohibited bias-motivated disorderly 
conduct.109 St. Paul’s statute was substantially overbroad110 and violated the First 
Amendment by censoring speech on the basis of content (i.e., bias-motivated 
content) because it only placed prohibitions on speech that discriminated on the 
basis of “race, color, creed, religion[,] or gender.”111 While obscenity, defamation 
and fighting words can be regulated because of their content, the St. Paul ordinance 
went “beyond mere content, to actual viewpoint discrimination.”112 
A 2003 cross-burning case that represents an exception to the anticontent 
discrimination rule is Virginia v Black. This case invoked “true threat,” rather than 
incitement.113 In Black, three individuals (including a leader of the Ku Klux Klan) 
were convicted separately under a Virginia statute banning cross-burning and their 
convictions were reversed by the Virginian Supreme Court, citing R.A.V. The 
Supreme Court, however, noted that the Virginia statute was analytically 
distinguishable from the statute at issue in R.A.V. since it was content and 
viewpoint neutral, simply making it a felony “for any person . . . with the intent of 
intimidating any person or group . . . to burn . . . a cross on the property of another, 
a highway or other public place,”114 regardless of viewpoint on race, religion, 
gender, political affiliation, or any other axis of identity.115  
 
107 See Bible Believers, 805 F.3d at 247 (reiterating the importance of content-neutral speech 
restrictions); see also Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1184-85 (9th Cir. 
2006) (discussing how public schools are excepted from the usual injunction on viewpoint 
discrimination and may prohibit student speech that disrupts school activities or violates the 
rights of other students). 
108 Bible Believers, 805 F.3d at 247. 
109 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 379, 396 (1992). 
110 Id. at 391. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. 
113 Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359-66 (2003). Black relies primarily on the 
jurisprudence related to threats but cites Brandenburg twice: for guidance on incitement and 
whether cross burning is protected expression. Id. at 359, 366. 
114 Id. at 348. 
115 The Court held as unconstitutional that section of the Virginia statute that claimed that cross 
burning constitutes, in itself, prima facie evidence of intent to intimidate. Id. at 345. Virginia’s 
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Justice O’Connor, writing for the majority, observed that cross-burning 
has been a symbol of the Ku Klux Klan’s reign of terror in the South since 
1866,116 and concluded that a state may ban cross-burning carried out with 
intent to intimidate, consistent with the First Amendment.117 Importantly, the 
Court confirmed that the First Amendment does not extend to true threats.118 
Intriguingly for our discussion, Black permits the suppression of true threats 
against collective groups, be they families or racial or religious groups. It is 
possible that under Black’s definition of group threat, Clarence Brandenburg’s 
declarations of his violent intentions towards African Americans, uttered using 
an ethnic slur and alongside armed Klansmen and in front of a burning cross, 
may have constituted a true threat.119 The ruling in Black could constitute a 
charter for how state legislatures may write statutes banning incitement and true 
threats that call for violent action. 
Of the three elements of the Brandenburg test, advocacy has received 
the most interpretation and guidance in the subsequent constitutional 
jurisprudence. The speaker must directly advocate lawless action and not 
simply express a provocative or unpopular view that may result in public 
disorder.120 This is not an objective test because the speaker must intend that 
others commit an offense, and their intentionality need not be expressed via an 
instruction for the specific offense committed but may be implicitly 
understood.121 As established in R.A.V., restrictions on speech cannot be 
content- or viewpoint-based.122 
 
D. The Elements of Incitement: Imminence 
 
Imminence is the second element of the Brandenburg test, and, combined 
with the likelihood prong, it distinguishes modern incitement from the repressive 
jurisprudence of the “bad tendency” and “clear and present danger” tests. Along 
with conspiracy and attempt, incitement is an inchoate crime.123 The standard 
 
statute read, “[a]ny such burning of a cross shall be prima facie evidence of an intent to 
intimidate a person or group of persons,” id. at 348, on the grounds that this unnecessarily 
suppresses ideas and abjures consideration of any contextual factors. Id. at 345. 
116 Id. at 352-57. 
117 Id. at 362. 
118 See id. at 360 (explaining that a prohibition on true threats protects individuals from the 
fear of violence and the disturbances that fear creates). 
119 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 446 n.1 (1969) (per curiam). 
120 Id. at 447-48. 
121 Bible Believers v. Wayne Cty., Mich., 805 F.3d 228, 245, 246 n.11 (6th Cir. 2015).  
122 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992). 
123 JOSHUA DRESSLER & STEPHEN P. GARVEY, CASES AND MATERIALS IN CRIMINAL LAW 
772 (6th ed. 2012); Larry Alexander & Kimberly D. Kessler, Mens Rea and Inchoate Crimes, 
87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1138, 1139 (1997). 
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justification for inchoate crimes is that they are crimes of prevention,124 designed 
for circumstances in which the offense is impending, and there is not sufficient 
time to expose “falsehoods and fallacies”125 in the marketplace of ideas,126 or to 
allow deliberation on the part of the listener, or give police enough time to take 
appropriate measures.127 
By requiring imminence, Brandenburg built on Schenck’s language 
of “proximity and degree,” but Brandenburg did not explain precisely how 
imminent the lawless action must be to warrant suppression of the speech. 
Proximity remained undefined until another per curiam Court decision, Hess 
v. Indiana.128 Gregory Hess was convicted for disorderly conduct during an 
anti-Vietnam war demonstration on the campus of Indiana University. After 
police forced a group of about 100 student demonstrators blocking traffic to 
move to the sidewalk, Hess said in a normal voice and to no one in particular, 
"We’ll take the fucking street later [or again]."129 The Supreme Court 
reversed the conviction, stating that Hess’s words could not be considered 
obscenity,130 fighting words, or insult since they were not directed at any 
particular person.131  
According to the Court, Hess’s utterance was ambivalent and did not 
call for any immediate action.132 Lawless action was only encouraged “at 
some indefinite future time,”133 which was insufficient to justify a conviction 
for incitement, because, citing Brandenburg, the lawless action must be 
imminent. Hess did not demarcate any clear temporal boundaries of 
imminence, but analysts have inferred that “imminent” meant immediately or 
 
124 For more context regarding inchoate crimes, see generally ANDREW ASHWORTH & LUCIA 
ZEDNER, PREVENTATIVE JUSTICE (2014) and Michael T. Cahill, Defining Inchoate Crime: 
An Incomplete Attempt, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 751 (2012). 
125 As Justice Brandeis eloquently stated, “If there be time to expose through discussion the 
falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be 
applied is more speech, not enforced silence.” Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 
(1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
126 See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (Holmes, J. dissenting) (“[T]he best test of 
truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market . . . .”). 
127 See generally Healy, supra note 26, at 680 (examining imminence and police intervention 
in the Al-Timimi case). 
128 Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973) (per curiam); see Smolla, supra note 37, at 22-30 
(analyzing imminence in Hess and the development of imminence after Brandenburg). 
129 Hess, 414 U.S. at 107. 
130 By 1973, the word “fuck” was no longer considered obscene. Id. at 107 (citing Cohen v. 
California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), in which the defendant wore a jacket bearing the antiwar 
message, “Fuck the Draft”). 
131 Id.at 107-08. 
132 Id. at 108-09. 
133 Id. 
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within a few hours, not a day or several days or weeks later.134 Greenawalt 
sees the “imminent” in Hess as “momentarily” or in the “very near future.”135  
Imminence was further defined by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
NAACP. v. Claiborne Hardware Co, a civil case brought by white store 
owners against African American leaders who organized a boycott of white-
owned stores in Claiborne County, Mississippi in 1966 and 1967.136 One of 
the defendants, NAACP field secretary Charles Evers, had threatened African 
Americans in the community with physical harm if they patronized white-
owned stores, saying “If we catch any of you going in any of them racist 
stores, we’re gonna break your damn neck.”137  
Reversing the convictions, the Court made clear “that mere advocacy 
of the use of force or violence does not remove speech from the protection 
of the First Amendment” unless that violence is imminent.138 Acts of 
violence and intimidation were prevalent after Evers’s 1966 speech, 
including shots fired into a home, a brick thrown through a windshield and 
beatings of boycott-breakers, but these happened some “weeks or months” 
later, and therefore could not be considered proximate to the speech act.139 
As in Hess, the Supreme Court refrained from specifying exactly how soon 
after Evers’ speech any violence would have had to have occurred for the 
defendant to be held liable. 
The temporal duration of imminence was extended significantly in 
1979 by the California Court of Appeal in People v. Rubin,140 in which the 
defendant, the national director of the Jewish Defense League, offered a 
reward for the murder or serious injury of any Nazi participant in a march 
planned in Skokie, Illinois, some five weeks later. At a press conference, 
Irving Rubin held up five hundred-dollar bills and said he would give them 
to any person who “kills, maims, or seriously injures a member of the 
American Nazi Party. . . . And if they bring us the ears, we’ll make it a 
thousand dollars. The fact of the matter is, that we’re deadly serious. This is 
not said in jest, we are deadly serious.”141  
The California appeals court determined that five weeks was sufficiently 
imminent to trigger the application of Brandenburg: “We think solicitation of 
murder . . . even though five weeks away, can qualify as incitement to imminent 
 
134 See Healy, supra note 26, at 715-17 (explaining that as time passes, predicting the 
likelihood of a crime becomes more difficult as conditions and variables may change). 
135 GREENAWALT, supra note 37, at 267. 
136 NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 889-91 (1982). 
137 Id. at 902.  
138 Id. at 927 (emphasis in original). 
139 Id. at 928. 
140 People v. Rubin, 96 Cal. App. 3d 968, 979 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979). 
141 Id. at 982. 
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lawless action.”142 The court refrained from any categorical statement that 
imminence hinges on gravity, however. Instead, using metaphorical and 
elliptical language, the court tentatively suggested that imminence is a relative 
concept and suggested that it varied according to the “nature” (i.e., gravity) of 
the crime being incited: “But time is a relative dimension and imminence a 
relative term, and the imminence of an event is related to its nature. A total 
eclipse of the sun next year is said to be imminent. An April shower thirty 
minutes away is not.”143 Such lyrical and indirect speech is common in First 
Amendment cases and is utterly unconstructive.  
In the current digital era, imminence is coming under new scrutiny. In 
United States v. Fullmer, the Third Circuit found that the act of scheduling a 
specific time for an unlawful act committed online, even if that time is not 
immediate, was relevant in determining imminence. In Fullmer, an animal rights 
group’s website advocated electronic sit-ins, where many people access a 
website at the same time, causing it to crash. The advocacy group’s website 
provided a schedule for sit-ins and updates on ongoing sit-ins. Because the group 
provided information about sit-ins at specified times, the court found that the 
information about sit-ins was intended to incite an imminent unlawful act.144 
 
E. The Elements of Incitement: Likelihood 
 
In 1919, Justice Holmes’s formulation of the “clear and present danger” 
test was accompanied by an insistence that courts should assess the probability 
that a crime could ensue from dissenting speech. Debs demanded an assessment 
of the “reasonably probable effect” of speech,145 and Justice Holmes dissented 
in Abrams because he felt that the antiwar speech in question had little chance of 
having a tangible effect on the war effort since it represented little more than “the 
surreptitious publishing of a silly leaflet by an unknown man.”146  
Courts applying the “clear and present danger” test soon jettisoned the 
element of probability, and the majorities in Gitlow and Dennis took great pains 
to discount its relevance.147 Risk assessment reentered incitement doctrine via 
the constitutional law of fighting words, and specifically Cantwell. This case 
interpreted the “clear and present danger” test stringently by refusing to suppress 
insults, profanities or verbal abuse, and banning only those words “likely to 
provoke violence and disturbance of good order, even though no such eventuality 
 
142 Id. at 979. 
143 Id. at 978. 
144 United States v. Fullmer, 584 F.3d 132, 155 (3d Cir. 2009). 
145 Debs v. United States., 249 U.S. 211, 216 (1919). 
146 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 628 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).  
147 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 527 (1951); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 
669 (1925). 
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be intended.”148 What is intriguing about Cantwell is that it elevates probability 
over intentionality, an inversion of their conventional framing in First 
Amendment law. 
As noted, Brandenburg does not tell us how much a speech act must 
elevate the risk of an offense to justify its banning, and neither do Hess and 
Claiborne, subsequent cases that addressed the imminence prong. A combing of 
lower court cases turns up rather meager findings. In United States v. White, a 
2010 case of a white-supremacist website that solicited the murder of the 
foreperson of the jury that had convicted a white nationalist leader, the Seventh 
Circuit considered the defendant’s web posting in the context of the extremist 
community of Neo-Nazis frequenting the website (Overthrow.com), where 
enemies were frequently identified for assassination.149 White quotes the 
defendant’s own admission that his online solicitation to murder had “so great a 
potential for action.”150 Because the call reached a multitude of white supremacist 
readers, the Seventh Circuit held that “someone could kill or harm Juror A.”151 
Rubin promised to define the likelihood prong of Brandenburg by titling 
a whole section of the decision, “Degree: Likelihood of Producing Action,” but 
the section simply restates the obvious in an anecdotal manner, observing that 
emotional appeals to political violence are given respectability when transmitted 
by reputable news media and that words uttered with a serious intention are more 
likely to produce violence than those delivered in jest.152 Rubin offers no 
generalizable statement on probability, including the criteria on which to base any 
risk analysis or how much the speech must elevate the chances of violence to lose 
constitutional protection. 
Thus far, there has been no systematic discussion of the class of speech 
acts or the contextual factors most likely to incite imminent lawless action. The 
caselaw is anecdotal and has thus far abjured any comprehensive or rigorous 
statement of a generalizable principle of risk analysis. Courts are left to reach back 
to cases with wildly different fact patterns, with the result that principles gleaned 
from earlier trials are often misapplied.153  
 
148 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309 (1940).  
149 United States v. White, 610 F.3d 956, 957 (7th Cir. 2010). 
150 Id.  
151 Id. at 1016 (emphasis in original). 
152 People v. Rubin, 96 Cal. App. 3d 968, 979-80 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979). 
153 For instance, the appellants in Nwanguma v. Trump misapply Bible Believers in their brief 
to the Sixth Circuit when they fail to recognize that in Bible Believers, the irate crowd 
attacked the speakers rather than attacking other members of the audience who were targeted 
by the speaker. See Opening Brief of Appellants Donald J. Trump and Donald J. Trump for 
President, Inc. at 34-35, Nwanguma v. Trump, 903 F.3d 604 (6th Cir. 2018) (No. 17-6290). 
See generally Bible Believers v. Wayne Cty., Mich., 805 F.3d 228 (6th Cir. 2015). 
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First Amendment scholars have offered guidance on the requisite 
threshold of probability, and Smolla suggests a “more probable than not” 
standard that violence will ensue from inciting speech,154 but he gives no 
basis for his formulation, other than it seems like a promising place to start. 
Healy discusses likelihood under an article subheading on imminence, and 
suggests that the probability standard should be a “reasonable chance” that 
the harm will result,155 drawing on Greenawalt who recommends “reasonable 
likelihood,” an imprecise formulation that simply adds “reasonable” to 
“likelihood” to render the standard appear more, well, reasonable.156 Healy 
mulls over a hypothetical scenario that could elevate or depress the likelihood 
of a crime occurring if, for instance, a speaker encourages a crowd to storm 
the city hall in five hours, but draws few general principles.157  
And that is all we have to go on with respect to the likely meaning of 
Brandenburg’s “likely to incite or produce.”158 It is not an overstatement to 
conclude that the likelihood prong of the Brandenburg three-part test is 
woefully underdeveloped and largely anecdotal, to the extent that it hampers 
the meaningful application of the element, and possibly interferes with the 
application of incitement law tout court. According to Gey, the end result of 
the Brandenburg test is “a system guaranteeing virtually absolute protection 
of free speech within the realm of political advocacy.”159  
The manifest lack of protection for the persons targeted by inciting 
speech is related in part to the dearth of guidance on key elements of the 
Brandenburg test, and incitement law could greatly benefit from more precise 
and accurate guidance on the elements of imminence and probability. Thus 
 
154 See Smolla, supra note 38, at 10 (“The ‘likelihood’ prong of Brandenburg appears to 
mean simply that it is more probable than not that violence will ensue as a result of the 
defendants’ action.”). 
155 See Healy, supra note 26, at 715 n.358 (“Greenawalt has proposed a similar standard, 
arguing that there must be a ‘reasonable likelihood’ that criminal advocacy will lead to 
crime.”); see also id. at 721 (“As a middle position, therefore, we might conclude that the 
government can prohibit advocacy of extraordinary harm if there is a ‘reasonable chance’ 
that the harm will result.”). 
156 See GREENAWALT, supra note 37, at 267-68 (stating that the likelihood should be 
“substantial” and vary according to the gravity of the crime).  
157 In Healy’s own words, 
As the time frame expands outward, however, the prediction becomes 
increasingly difficult because of the many unknowable variables involved. 
If a speaker urges a rowdy audience to storm city hall five hours later, it 
may initially appear likely that they will do so. But many things could 
happen between now and then to dissuade them. 
Healy, supra note 26, at 716. 
158 Furthermore, to our knowledge there is no discussion at all of the phrase “or produce,” 
either in the caselaw or in legal scholarship. 
159 Gey, supra note 5, at 975. 
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far, to our knowledge, there has been no comprehensive and contemporary 
statement on the conditions that predict uptake of inciting speech by listeners.  
 
III.  CAUSATION, IMMINENCE, AND LIKELIHOOD  
 
Why does it matter that the Brandenburg test only provides meager 
guidance on its contextual elements? Stated plainly, until incitement doctrine 
includes an unambiguous definition of probability and a systematic 
framework for risk analysis, courts are still in the terrain of the “clear and 
present danger” test, or worse, “bad tendency” doctrine. For the past one 
hundred years, the U.S. Supreme Court and the lower courts have aspired to 
go beyond the suppression of mere advocacy and to evaluate the potential 
harms of speech in its context; hence the “proximity and degree” language of 
the “clear and present danger” standard, and the imminence and likelihood 
elements of the Brandenburg test.  
In a democracy, a systematic framework of risk assessment is 
required to evaluate political speech, but this project has progressed in fits 
and starts and is still incomplete. As long as the nonadvocacy prongs remain 
undefined, the legal regulation of political speech will remain unpredictable 
and inconsistent, and this will undermine its legitimacy. Without a reliable 
and defensible guide to predicting what categories of public speech acts in 
what kinds of contexts are more likely to prompt violence, the courts cannot 
fulfill the main rationale of incitement law, namely the prevention of 
substantial evils that Congress and state legislatures have a right to prevent. 
If the state cannot adequately protect its citizenry from one another and 
prevent foreseeable harms, then it has failed in its most elementary duty.160 
At this point, it is worth reviewing first principles. Like conspiracy 
and attempt, incitement is an inchoate crime,161 where the verbal 
 
160 In Karl Popper’s liberal democratic theory of the state, the state exists to protect citizens’ 
freedoms from the aggression of others. KARL POPPER, THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES 
110-11 (5th ed. 1966). Consistent with Thomas Hobbes’ version of the social contract, 
Popper conceives the origins of the state in its function as a crime prevention society based 
upon a social contract with its citizens to provide for their security. See id. (“I am perfectly 
ready to see my own freedom of action somewhat curtailed by the state, provided I can obtain 
protection of that freedom which remains . . . . [T]he state should be considered as a society 
for the prevention of crime i.e. aggression.”).  
161 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY defines an inciter as: 
[O]ne who counsels, commands or advises the commission of a crime. It 
will be observed that this definition is much the same as that of an 
accessory before the fact. What, then, is the difference between the two? 
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communication completes the offense and there need be no uptake on the part 
of the listener to commit the crime nor indeed any consequences at all. 
Inchoate crimes are crimes of prevention, designed to interdict a harmful 
chain of causation once a substantial step has been taken towards 
commission. Charging a crime ab initio is the only way to prevent the 
offense,162 for instance when there is no time for police action, persuasion, 
and counterspeech to do their work.  
What is apparent is that if it is to suppress inciting speech, law 
enforcement must necessarily engage in risk analysis based upon the context 
of the incitement. Prevention is simply impossible without predictive 
forecasting of likely consequences. In every incitement trial, the question is 
the same: does the speech act directly advocate an offense and if so, then does 
the advocacy sufficiently elevate the risk that an offense will ensue, to the 
extent that the speech loses its constitutional protection? Once the advocacy 
prong is fulfilled and it is established that the speaker possessed the requisite 
intention to advocate the commission of the crime, then liability hinges on 
whether it is likely that imminent lawless action will occur. 
The likelihood that a crime will be committed depends on the 
circumstances of the speech act: context is everything. In First Amendment 
jurisprudence, it is now received wisdom that, “the character of every act 
depends upon the circumstances in which it is done.”163 The same words that 
are uncontroversial in a peaceful context may be inciting in a violent scenario; 
 
It is that in incitement the crime has not (or has not necessarily) been 
committed, whereas a party cannot be an accessory in crime unless the 
crime has been committed. An accessory before the fact is party to 
consummated mischief; an inciter is guilty only of an inchoate crime. 
Incitement, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (emphasis added) (quoting GLANVILLE 
WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART 612 (Stevens & Sons eds., 2d ed. 1961)). 
162 Incitement overlaps conceptually with attempt, and Justice Douglas’s concurring opinion 
in Brandenburg recalls that in Schenck, the defendant was charged with attempts to cause 
insubordination in the military and to obstruct enlistment. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 
444, 450 (1969). In incitement, the substantial step that warrants intervention is the direct 
advocacy of a crime where the commission is imminent and likely. Gideon Yaffe elaborates 
on this observation, noting, 
In cases of this kind, whether a solicitation is enough for the act element 
of the attempt depends on two things: on the nature of the crime and the 
circumstances, and on the test that the court in question employs for 
determining whether the defendant’s act was enough for the act element 
of the attempt. 
GIDEON YAFFE, ATTEMPTS 197 (2010). 
163 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919); see also Bose Corp. v. Consumers 
Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 504-05 (1984) (“In each of these areas, the limits of the 
unprotected category, as well as the unprotected character of particular communications, 
have been determined by the judicial evaluation of special facts that have been deemed to 
have constitutional significance.”). 
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“[An] utterance in a context of violence can lose its significance as an appeal 
to reason and become part of an instrument of force.”164 After Brandenburg, 
imminence and likelihood represent the required contextual elements that 
define inciting speech. The actus reus elements of incitement are located 
therefore in the actual speech act itself, and in a situation where the 
commission of the crime is both imminent and likely. The mens rea of 
incitement resides in the direct advocacy of a crime, but advocacy is benign 
unless it occurs in a hazardous setting where there is a heightened probability 
that the crime will be committed imminently.  
Together, imminence and likelihood characterize the potential nexus 
between the speech act and the future crime, and therefore could be 
considered tests of causation, but because incitement is an inchoate crime, 
they are tests of potential, future, or probable causation. The incitement 
caselaw says nothing about probable causation, so what exactly is it? Legal 
philosophers such as Michael Moore have argued that all causation involves 
the elevation of probability, or is, in his words, “chance-raising.”165 For 
Moore, chance-raising is a reasonable test of causation, and he observes that 
in law, an increase in the probability of effectuating a result is part of the very 
definition of cause: “a cause is the raising of the probability of its effect.”166  
For their part, courts have studiously avoided all discussion of 
probable causation and the relationship between imminence and likelihood. 
Nor have they provided any general guidance on how to determine probable 
causation as opposed to the conventional garden-variety (completed) 
causation usually required in criminal law. As criteria that indicate an 
enhanced risk of causation, there is a certain element of redundancy in the 
inclusion of both likelihood and imminence, since a bad result which is 
imminent is also likely and that which is likely is, probabilistically, more 
imminent (or at least more imminent than it was when it was unlikely). 
Imminence and likelihood are conceptually interrelated and partially define 
one another, according to the expression: “more likely, more imminent,” or 
the formula, >L ⇄ >I. 
Even though the Brandenburg precedent is fifty years old, contemporary 
courts still invoke opaque criteria when evaluating probable causation and when 
distinguishing this task from conventional, backward-looking appraisals of 
 
164 Milk Wagon Drivers Union of Chi., Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 
287, 293 (1941). 
165 See MICHAEL S. MOORE, CAUSATION AND RESPONSIBILITY: AN ESSAY IN LAW, MORALS 
AND METAPHYSICS 307-09 (2009) (noting that “risk-based” liability for raising the 
probability of a harm or crime is widely recognized in both criminal and civil responsibility 
doctrines). 
166 Id. at 307. 
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causation. Recalling the adage attributed to the physicist Niels Bohr, “It is difficult 
to make predictions, especially about the future,” it is worth acknowledging that 
assessing the risk of a future harm is inherently tentative, and is an exercise fraught 
with, well, risk. And yet in incitement cases, the police, prosecutors, and the courts 
currently possess few analytical tools to engage in risk assessment.  
In practice, judges put their faith in conventional heuristics, or mental 
shortcuts allowing decisions about complex material, that are part of the habitual 
parlance of judging and derived from “common sense.”167 Stated less generously, 
judges are deciding incitement cases on the basis of cognitive illusions, hunches, 
intuitions, and implicit biases.  
 As a result of incitement doctrine’s conceptual lacunae, courts have fallen 
into three unhealthy habits with respect to the causation dimensions of incitement. 
First, they have reverse-engineered probable causation from the concrete 
consequences of a speech act, also known as the logical fallacy of post hoc ergo 
propter hoc.168 Second, they have advanced confusing and misleading metaphors 
of speech to connect public speech to ensuing harms. Finally, they have enunciated 
general theories of the relationship between speech and social behavior 
that lack any empirical substantiation. We address these three forms of 
flawed reasoning in turn. 
 
A. Post Hoc Ergo Propter Hoc 
 
In key incitement cases, there has been a tendency to analyze risk on the 
basis of the putative consequences of speech, and to construe these effects as an 
intrinsic and inexorable result of speech. In philosophy as in law, post hoc ergo 
propter hoc is a logical fallacy169 that holds (incorrectly) that that if Y occurred 
after X, then X must have caused Y. Since the Scottish Enlightenment 
philosopher David Hume, however, it is accepted that chronology does not 
prove causation. In their landmark treatise Causation in the Law, Hart and 
 
167 Amos Taversky and Daniel Kahneman explain this phenomenon further, stating 
This judgmental heuristic is called availability. Availability is a useful clue 
for assessing frequency or probability, because instances of large classes 
are usually reached better and faster than instances of less frequent classes. 
However, availability is affected by factors other than frequency and 
probability. Consequently, the reliance on availability leads to predictable 
biases . . . . 
Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 
in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 3, 11 (Daniel Kahneman et 
al. eds., 1982). 
168 Literally, “after this, therefore, because of this.” 
169 Along with other logical fallacies such as generalization from one occurrence, claim-
begging, and tautological argumentation. 
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Honoré affirmed that “not all events which follow each other in invariable 
sequence are causally related.”170  
Unquestionably, harms may occur for reasons that are completely 
unrelated to a speech act, for instance when the intended injury is performed 
by a person who did not hear the original incitement. Furthermore, a speech 
act that directly advocates a crime and substantially raises the risk of 
imminent lawless action to a threshold that justifies its banning under law 
may not actually trigger the harm. Causation is, after all, probabilistic, and a 
communicative input may not generate a criminal outcome in every instance. 
Illustrating this phenomenon, the Supreme Court reverse-engineered 
imminence and likelihood in Claiborne Hardware when it found that Charles 
Evers’ public threat to break the “damn neck” of any individual violating the 
boycott of white stores171 was protected speech, but with the qualification that 
“[i]f that language had been followed by acts of violence, a substantial 
question would be presented whether [the speaker] could be held liable for 
the consequences of that unlawful conduct.”172  
As it happened, there were multiple acts of violence against African 
Americans accused of violating the NAACP’s boycott in Claiborne County, 
Mississippi, but the Court discounted this because the violence occurred 
some “weeks or months” after Evers’ speech.173 Here, the inchoate character 
of the crime of incitement is extinguished when the elements of probable 
causation are determined ex post facto by reference to the ensuing 
consequences of speech, rather than by reference to the degree to which the 
criminal advocacy elevated the risk of violence in the moment and 
circumstances in which the advocacy occurred. 
Similarly, in McCoy v. Stewart, the Ninth Circuit held that the 
defendant’s argument that his advice on how to commit criminal offenses 
to members of a street gang called the “Bratz” was mere idle talk would 
be nullified, 
if the state could prove that the speech actually caused 
imminent lawless action. Here, however, McCoy correctly 
observes that his words did not actually incite anyone to 
commit a crime. There is no evidence in the record that the 
Bratz engaged in any crime as a result of his advice. Indeed, 
there is no evidence that McCoy’s speech played any part at 
all in any crime committed by the Bratz.174  
 
170 H.L.A. HART & TONY HONORÉ, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 15 (Oxford Univ. Press 2d ed. 1985). 
171 NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 902 (1982). 
172 Id. at 928. 
173 Id. at 904, 928. 
174 McCoy v. Stewart, 282 F.3d 626, 631 n.6 (9th Cir. 2002).  
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Finally, in American Freedom Defense Initiative v. Metropolitan 
Transportation Authority, the court held that there was no element of 
imminence present in the ads that referred to the murder of Jews because no 
acts of violence could be attributed to the ads.175 As in Claiborne, the courts 
seem to be saying that incitement can only be proven if there is evidence of 
actual harm, rather than judging the facts by reference to the ex ante 
imminence and likelihood elements of the Brandenburg test. 
More examples could be found. What is apparent in each instance is 
that the court is mistakenly deciding the elements of imminence and 
probability on the basis of what happened next, that is, actual causation 
specific to the facts of the case, rather than probable causation at the moment 
of the utterance in a particular context. As argued, this constitutes specious 
reasoning about the probable causation pertaining to an inchoate crime, 
which must be performed ex ante rather than ex post facto.  
Determining likelihood and imminence on the basis of outcomes 
underlines the deep-seated tension between the probable causation elements 
of incitement and the inchoate nature of crime, an unresolved tension that 
explains the inconsistencies in reasoning and doctrine. When the putative 
consequences of a speech act are invoked in determining the two actus reus 
elements of the crime of incitement—imminence and likelihood—then actual 
causation becomes an element of the crime and incitement can no longer be 
considered an inchoate crime.  
Logically, this defeats the preventative ends of making incitement a 
crime in the first place, and it compels the potential victims of speech that 
incites hate crime to absorb all the risks of the calls to violence against them. 
If there is an unspoken consensus that courts will only find incitement when 
the crime being incited occurs, and if indictments must demonstrate a causal 
nexus between inciting speech and criminal acts, then criminal prosecutors 
are likely to wait until a crime has been completed before charging an 
individual for incitement. The approach of the courts has thwarted the ends 
of crime prevention. 
 
B. Misleading Metaphors of Causation 
 
First Amendment jurisprudence is a metaphor-rich environment in 
which judges unleash their lyrical passions. The doyen of First Amendment 
poetic license is Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, who penned such 
 
175 See Am. Freedom Def. Initiative v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 70 F. Supp. 3d 572, 582-83 
(S.D.N.Y. 2015) (“The defendants also cannot point to any objective evidence to support 
their concerns that the advertisement is an imminent incitement of violence . . . . Therefore, 
these ads—offensive as they may be—are still entitled to First Amendment protection.”), 
vacated, 109 F. Supp. 3d 626 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), aff’d, 815 F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 2016). 
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memorable lines as “the word is . . . not transparent . . ., it is the skin of a 
living thought . . . .”176 Even more renowned is Holmes’s marketplace of ideas 
metaphor which construes public, political speech as a consumer item that 
can be freely bought and sold.177 Even though it was coined nearly a hundred 
years ago, the marketplace metaphor still has currency in recent First 
Amendment cases.178 
Some metaphors in incitement rulings are conspicuously causal and 
describe the nexus between speech and subsequent action. Causal metaphors 
are more than just an attractive adornment to a decision. They do actual work 
by verifying the connection between words and acts that may not be easily 
discernible in the evidence presented to the court. For instance, in Dennis, a 
Red Scare case in which the defendants were convicted simply of reading and 
discussing Marxist works, the judgment approvingly cited Judge Learned 
Hand in Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten: “One may not counsel or advise 
others to violate the law as it stands. Words are not only the keys of 
persuasion, but the triggers of action . . . .”179  
Metaphors of fire and conflagration abound in incitement decisions, 
and were particularly a feature of the “bad tendency” or “advocacy alone is 
sufficient” standard of incitement.180 In Frohwerk, the U.S. Supreme Court 
acknowledged that the defendant’s publication of antiwar and pro-Germany 
sentiments in the weekly newspaper Missouri Staats-Zeitung seemingly 
posed a minimal risk because it was a local Kansas City newspaper 
published in German, but the Court convicted him nonetheless on the 
grounds that “it is impossible to say that it might not have been found that 
 
176 Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918). 
177 Holmes called upon this analogy in Abrams v. United States, writing in dissent, 
But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they 
may come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of 
their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free 
trade in ideas—that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get 
itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only 
ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out. 
250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
178 See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 354 (2010) (asserting 
that a previous opinion, overruled by this decision, “interferes with the ‘open marketplace’ 
of ideas protected by the First Amendment”); Bible Believers v. Wayne Cty., 805 F.3d 228, 
243 (6th Cir. 2015), (“The First Amendment offers sweeping protection that allows all 
manner of speech to enter the marketplace of ideas.”). 
179 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 571 (1951) (quoting Masses Publ’g Co. v. Patten, 
244 F. 535, 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1917)). 
180 They did not, therefore, originate in another Holmes’s aphorism that “[t]he most stringent 
protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theater and 
causing panic.” Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).  
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the circulation of the paper was in quarters where a little breath would be 
enough to kindle a flame and that the fact was known and relied upon by 
those who sent the paper out.”181  
The conviction of Socialist Party of America member Benjamin 
Gitlow relied on a similar combustion metaphor regarding the potential harms 
of political speech when it held that “[a] single revolutionary spark may 
kindle a fire that, smouldering for a time, may burst into a sweeping and 
destructive conflagration.”182 Fire and conflagration metaphors abound in 
recent cases such as United States v. White, in which the Seventh Circuit held 
that the white supremacist website posting the name of a jury foreman and 
inviting readers to harm him was “playing with fire,”183 adding yet more 
redolent imagery to the district court’s metaphor of speech as “powerful 
medicine” in that case.184  
 Some legal scholars have objected to the prevalence of 
metaphorical and figurative language in judgments.185 Felix Cohen 
famously excoriated the U.S. Supreme Court’s figurative language in 
deciding where a company resided (and therefore could be sued) in Tauza 
v. Susquehanna Coal Company.186 Cohen condemned the Court’s use of 
 
181 Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 209 (1919). 
182 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 669 (1925).  
183 United States v. White, 698 F.3d 1005, 1014 (7th Cir. 2012) (“The fact that White made 
an effort to discourage assassination attempts against Juror A when law enforcement moved 
against his website shows at a minimum that he knew he was playing with fire.”). 
184 As Judge Adelman held in another United States v. White opinion, 
The constitutional right of free expression is powerful medicine in a 
society as diverse and populous as ours. It is designed and intended to 
remove governmental restraints from the arena of public discussion, 
putting the decision as to what views shall be voiced largely into the hands 
of each of us . . . . 
638 F. Supp. 2d 935, 956 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971)). 
185 See Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. 
REV. 809, 812 (1935) (describing the use of metaphor in jurisprudence a distraction from the 
actual “social forces which mold the law and the social ideas by which the law is to be 
judged”). See generally RICHARD ASHBY WILSON, INCITEMENT ON TRIAL: PROSECUTING 
INTERNATIONAL SPEECH CRIMES 152-65 (2017) (detailing historical ambivalence about the 
use of metaphor in jurisprudence and concluding that such the rhetorical device is often used 
“in a way that is misleading and rests on a defective psychology”). 
186 See generally Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 115 N.E. 915 (1917) (describing the 
relevant corporation’s objection that it could not be sued in New York, even though it 
regularly conducted business there, because it was headquartered and established somewhere 
else). Responding to the decision in Tauza, Cohen wrote, 
Yet it is exactly in these terms of transcendental nonsense that the Court of 
Appeals approached the question of whether the Susquehanna Coal 
Company could be sued in New York State. ‘The essential thing,’ said 
Judge Cardozo, writing for a unanimous court, ‘is that the corporation shall 
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metaphor and analogy in determining the factual question, “where is a 
corporation?” on the grounds that symbolic discourse interfered with a 
rational and scientific deliberation of the facts of the case.187 Since Cohen, 
philosophers have developed a critique of metaphorical language and 
argued that metaphors are not propositional in character,188 are confusing, 
emotive, and unsuited to serious scientific inquiry,189 and are “empty of 
guidance for the court.”190 
 Metaphors are not simply adornments in First Amendment law, and 
as the linguistic philosopher J.L. Austin observed, they do things.191 
Metaphors convert the complex relationship between a speech act and its 
context into a set of physical objects that make up the material-object 
world, transforming what are in fact social relations (how a speaker might 
goad others into acts of violence) into material-object-world relations. 
Metaphors of fire or medicine allow judges to posit a mechanistic causal 
relationship between advocacy and behavior. When courts perceive 
speech as analogous to a smoldering fire or “triggers of action” or 
“powerful medicine,” they characterize the possible mental causation 
between persons in the paradigm of physical laws of cause and effect, laws 
that more easily conform to criminal law’s standard model of causation.  
 Yet this analogy is built on a false premise. Unlike fire or medicine, 
humans possess intentionality and agency,192 and the intersubjective dynamics 
 
have come into the State.’ Why this journey is essential, or how it is 
possible, we are not informed. The opinion notes that the corporation has 
an office in the State, with eight salesmen and eleven desks, and concludes 
that the corporation is really ‘in’ New York State. From this inference it 
easily follows that since a person who is in New York can be sued here, 
and since a corporation is a person, the Susquehanna Coal Company is 
subject to suit in a New York court 
 Cohen, supra note 185, at 811-12.  
187 Cohen, supra note 185, at 811 (critiquing Judge Cardozo’s choice of transcendental 
language to describe the legal location of a corporation). 
188 See Donald Davidson, What Metaphors Mean, in INQUIRIES INTO TRUTH AND 
INTERPRETATION 262 (2d ed. 2001) (denying that metaphors stand for specific facts or have 
“specific cognitive content”). 
189 Id. at 247.  
190 HART & HONORÉ, supra note 170, at 97. 
191 J.L. AUSTIN, How to Do Things With Words, in THE WILLIAM JAMES LECTURES 
DELIVERED AT HARVARD UNIVERSITY IN 1955 6 (1962) (“[T]o utter the sentence . . . is not 
to describe my doing of what I should be said in so uttering to be doing or to state that I am 
doing it: it is to do it.”). 
192 By “agency” we refer to intentionality and a minimum capacity to take preliminary steps 
towards the fulfillment of the intention. See JOHN R. SEARLE, RATIONALITY IN ACTION 95-
96 (2001) (identifying the following feature of a rational agent: she is conscious, persists 
through time, operates with reasons, and is capable of deciding, initiating and carrying out 
actions and is responsible for at least some of her behavior).  
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of persuasion between persons is more complicated than a fire spreading 
through a forest or a medicine being administered to a patient. In addition to 
raising valid due process concerns (how does one appeal against a conviction 
written in flights of figurative fancy?), metaphors hinder our comprehension of 
how exactly and realistically an advocacy might have increased the likelihood 
of an imminent offense. As an antirealist language, metaphors should not serve 
as the basis of legal reasoning, especially when they contemplate the contextual 
elements of speech.193 Metaphorical language of the type that is often present 
in calls to violence ought to be met with sober deliberation in the courts, not yet 
more metaphorical speech. 
 
C. Baseless Theories of Speech  
 
“[W]hen we don’t have enough knowledge to decide a case in 
an informed way, we necessarily fall back on how we ‘feel’ 
about the case.” 
–Judge Richard A. Posner194 
 
 This Section demonstrates that in First Amendment cases, judges are 
often prone to making generalized assertions about social behavior, and in 
particular, about the likely consequences of speech that provokes a violent 
response, or which denigrates or threatens a social group. These claims are 
seldom, if ever, accompanied by empirical substantiation of any kind, and appear 
to be based on the judges’ intuitions, unconscious biases, and rules of thumb.  
Some judicial statements about the effects of speech are plausible, 
others are utterly implausible, but whatever the case, judicial declarations are 
often made without any supporting evidence, and therefore are unverified. 
And yet these claims can play an essential role in the judges’ reasoning in 
hard cases. For example, Justice Brandeis claimed in Whitney that “It is the 
function of speech to free men from the bondage of irrational fears,”195 
although that would obviously depend on the kind of speech. Self-evidently, 
political speech can inculcate irrational fears and instigate public disorder and 
violence, otherwise there would be no basis for laws regulating incitement, 
true threats, and fighting words.  
 
193 See Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co. 155 N.E. 58, 61 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1926) (“Metaphors in 
law are to be narrowly watched, for starting as devices to liberate thought, they end often by 
enslaving it."). See generally Steven L. Winter, Transcendental Nonsense, Metaphoric 
Reasoning, and the Cognitive Stakes for Law, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1162–63 (1989) 
(summarizing critiques of metaphors in legal reasoning). 
194 Joel Cohen, An Interview with Judge Richard A. Posner, A.B.A. J. (July 1, 2014, 10:20 AM), 
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/an_interview_with_judge_richard_a._posner [https 
://perma.cc/7868-JQT5]. 
195 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
Vol. 5:2] Incitement in an Era of Populism  
 
 
   
 
91 
 Further in this vein, in deciding that the burning of the American flag 
was constitutionally protected speech, the Supreme Court stated in Texas v. 
Johnson that taking “serious offense” at an expression is not “necessarily 
likely” to provoke a disturbance of the peace.196 The conjoining of 
“necessarily” and “likely” seems like clever hedging on the part of the 
Justices, and leaves imprecise the Court’s opinion on the nature of the 
probabilistic relationship between taking serious offence and subsequent 
disorder. Of course, the taking of offense does not necessarily cause violence 
in all instances. However, behavioral research on the defilement of national 
symbols indicates that taking serious offense does increase the chances that 
there will be disorder. For instance, moral foundations psychologist 
Jonathan Haidt writes about how the flag is conceived as “one of the sacred 
pillars supporting the community” and an object of “infinite value,” the 
desecration of which is sure to lead to a response that is “swift, emotional, 
collective and punitive.”197  
 Judicial decisions frequently pronounce on the nature of the harms 
experienced by historically disadvantaged communities subjected to true 
threats and incitement in an evidentiary vacuum. Justice Scalia, writing for 
the majority in the cross-burning case of R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, struck 
down the city ordinance banning cross-burning and daubing swastikas by 
reasoning that injury caused by an expression of group hatred is not 
“qualitatively different” from injury which does not invoke group hatred.198 
No evidence is provided for this assertion, which set off a lively debate 
between the majority and Justice Stevens, who wrote a concurring opinion, 
about whether the denigration of a person’s race is of a qualitatively different 
order than speech that disparages their personal characteristics.199  
 This question has been tested empirically, and the social science 
literature has identified the uniquely harmful effects of racist speech. In two 
experiments, psychologists Boeckman and Liew tested Asian American 
 
196 See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 408 (1989) (“The State’s position, therefore, amounts 
to a claim that an audience that takes serious offense at particular expression is necessarily 
likely to disturb the peace and that the expression may be prohibited on this basis. Our 
precedents do not countenance such a presumption.”). 
197 See JONATHAN HAIDT, THE RIGHTEOUS MIND: WHY GOOD PEOPLE ARE DIVIDED BY 
POLITICS AND RELIGION 174 (2012) (describing emotional and punitive responses to the 
desecration of the flag). 
198 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 392-93 (1992) (discounting Justice 
Stevens’s claim that there was a “qualitatively different” type of injury targeted by the 
ordinance relevant for first amendment analysis). 
199 See id. at 392 (providing Justice Scalia’s opinion on the meaning of “qualitatively 
different” in context, which conflicts with Justice Stevens’ view); see also id. at 424-25 
(Stevens, J., concurring) (providing an alternative approach to Justice Scalia’s analysis). 
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students’ responses to racist speech relative to personal forms of insult, and 
their reactions to offenses that are motivated by group hatred (e.g., insulting 
speech) to those that are not (e.g., petty theft).200 They found that hate speech 
depressed collective self-esteem201 and caused more extreme emotional 
reactions than insults not based on group hatred. They concluded that hate 
speech is “distinctive”202 and has a “broader harmful impact . . . than other 
forms of insult or property crime.”203 In the light of this study and others,204 
Justice Scalia’s claims run contrary to the scientific evidence and therefore 
represent mere personal opinion. 
 Then there are the customary yardsticks used by the Court to measure 
the likely responses to provocation and therefore the likelihood of imminent 
lawless action. One objective standard found in fighting words doctrine is 
how the “average person” might respond, a thesis that originates in the 
“reasonable man” test for standards of care and foreseeability in tort law, as 
introduced by Justice Holmes.205 In First Amendment cases, the average 
person standard can serve as a legal fiction that cloaks the opinions and 
prejudices of the majority as to the kind of speech acts that give offense and 
prompt public disorder.  
 In Bible Believers, the Sixth Circuit held that carrying a severed pig’s 
head on a stick and placards stating that the Prophet Muhammed is a fraud and 
a pedophile was not speech “likely to provoke the average person.”206 Who 
exactly is the “average person” here? They do not seem to be a follower of the 
prophet Muhammed and the religion of Islam. The Court would have been well 
advised to avoid adopting a majoritarian (i.e., Christian) religious vantagepoint 
from which to evaluate how the Muslim community of Dearborn, Michigan 
 
200 Robert J. Boeckmann & Jeffrey Liew, Hate Speech: Asian American Students’ Justice 
Judgments and Psychological Responses, 58 J. SOC. ISSUES 363, 363 (2002). 
201 Id. at 377. 
202 Id. at 379. 
203 Id. at 365. 
204 See, e.g., Laura Beth Nielsen, Subtle, Pervasive, Harmful: Racist and Sexist Remarks in 
Public as Hate Speech, 58 J. SOC. ISSUES 265, 279 (studying the prevalence and severe effects 
of racist and sexist speech in public places); see also Brian Mullen & Joshua M. Smyth, 
Immigrant Suicide Rates as a Function of Ethnophaulisms: Hate Speech Predicts Death, 66 
PSYCHOSOMATIC MED. 343, 343 (2004) (studying the correlation between ethnic slurs and 
suicide in immigrant populations). 
205 In The Common Law, Holmes sought to resolve the problem of negligence in torts law by 
creating an objective standard to determine what outcomes are foreseeable from individual 
actions, so as to attribute liability in a credible manner. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE 
COMMON LAW 93 (1881) (describing the reasonable man test for foreseeable “consequences” 
that ought result in liability in tort).  
206 Bible Believers v. Wayne Cty., Mich., 805 F.3d 228, 246 (6th Cir. 2015) (citing Street v. 
New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969), which held that no advocacy can constitute fighting 
words unless it is “likely to provoke the average person to retaliation”). 
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might (and in fact, did, repeatedly) react to the evangelical group’s provocations. 
Instead, the court’s standard for inciting public disorder might begin with the 
attitudes and values of the members of the group who are the target of abusive 
and inciting speech. That is, how are most Muslims in Dearborn, Michigan likely 
to react to religiously based insults from the Bible Believers evangelical group? 
Indeed, an empirically verifiable standard of the risk of provocation was 
available to the Court, insofar as the Bible Believers’ speech had already 
prompted public disorder at the Arab International Festival in 2011, the year 
preceding the events in question.207 In response, the Bible Believers group 
ratcheted up their religious baiting at the 2012 cultural festival by parading with 
placards that expressed even more offensive insults about the prophet 
Muhammed and by carrying a severed pig’s head on a stick.  
 It has been established in other cases that when evaluating whether a 
speech act constitutes incitement, it is imperative to understand how the 
speaker’s intended audience, not the “average person” or the general public, 
would have understood her words.208 There is precedent in First Amendment 
law for evaluating the likely consequences of a speech act on the basis of its 
ordinary meaning for its intended audience, rather than the legal fiction of the 
“average person.” For instance, Gitlow affirmed that,  
The court, among other things, charged the jury, in substance, 
that they must determine what was the intent, purpose and fair 
meaning of the Manifesto; that its words must be taken in their 
ordinary meaning, as they would be understood by people whom 
it might reach.209 
 As we have demonstrated, judges often rely on metaphors that are 
misleading and non-falsifiable in incitement cases. They make generalized 
statements unsupported by any empirical research and employ standards to 
gauge likely responses that are not objective and as we just saw in Bible 
Believers, can convey majoritarian religious biases. Personal experience and 
the evidence presented in the trial are not be a sound basis for calculating risk. 
Determinations of fact that rely on a general model of speech and behavior 
and that lack empirical substance are therefore specious. In their desire to 
prioritize normative principles, decisions in incitement cases such as Bible 
 
207 Id. at 236. 
208 The same words may have entirely different meanings depending on the specific audience. 
Compare Saylor v. Bd. of Educ. of Harlan Cty, Ky., 118 F.3d 507, 509 (6th Cir. 1997) 
(describing the statement “I’ll take care of him” being taken to mean corporal punishment), 
with United States v. Franklin, 415 F.3d 537, 550 (6th Cir. 2005) (describing defendant’s 
promise to “take care of [him],” which witness understood as sharing proceeds of robbery). 
209 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 661 (1925). 
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Believers, R.A.V., and Texas v. Johnson have made proclamations about 
social behavior that are contradicted by behavioral research.  
A sounder basis for determining imminence and likelihood in 
incitement cases would involve disaggregating the brute facts from the guiding 
principles and accepting the facts of the case on the basis of the observed pattern 
of behavior, informed by relevant social science research on the topic. When 
the facts are congruent with the extant policy, then all is well. If the facts 
contradict the policy, then it is inadvisable, as courts have occasionally done, to 
reconfigure the facts to conform to the preferred policy.  
 Of course, even if the behavioral research does not support current 
policy, there may still exist compelling normative reasons to maintain the policy 
anyway. Where the facts of the matter are inconsistent with the desired policy 
of the court, for instance, arguendo, that flag burning creates widespread offense 
and offense is more likely to lead to violence, courts and legislatures may still 
decide to permit flag burning for other reasons, for instance, because they value 
vigorous political protest of a symbolic kind. We term this elevation of policy 
considerations over countervailing material facts in incitement law a “normative 
override.”210 Rather than concocting an implausible interpretation of the facts 
to suit the desired policy, it is preferable to acknowledge explicitly that the 
courts are engaging in a normative override.  
 There is much work to be done with respect to the probable causation 
elements of incitement doctrine and procedure. The consistency and 
predictability of the law of incitement would be enhanced if courts were 
transparent in advance about the criteria they use to evaluate the content and 
context of speech to determine whether it could foreseeably result in 
imminent lawless action.  
 
IV. A MATRIX FOR ASSESSING RISK 
 
“How are we going to substitute a realistic, rational, scientific 
account of legal happenings for the classical theological 
jurisprudence of concepts?”  
–Felix Cohen211 
 
For much of U.S. history, the crime of incitement was an 
instrument to suppress seditious and antiwar speech.212 In the mid-
twentieth century, courts began to orient doctrine to protecting individuals 
 
210 To our knowledge, “normative override” has not been previously used in this way in legal 
scholarship.  
211 See Cohen, supra note 185, at 821. 
212 See supra Subsection I.C. 
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from harm motivated by group bias.213 This transition is still incomplete. 
In order to complete it, First Amendment analysis in incitement cases must 
engage more fully in a contextual risk analysis. 
 The idea of risk assessment was introduced in the “clear and 
present danger” test, but its promise was never fully realized, and the test 
became a repressive tool.214 The fetters were lifted in Brandenburg which 
announced the elements of imminence and likelihood but did not define 
them.215 Consequently, judges and other legal actors have relied on models 
of speech that are metaphorical and inaccurate.216 As a result, the elements 
remain obscure, leaving the targets of incitement unprotected. The 
incitement matrix below offers an evidence-based approach to risk 
assessment informed by the latest research on the relationship between 
speech and behavior.217 The factors are organized under three general 
headings: the attributes of the speaker, the content of the message, and the 
context in which the message is delivered. Each is known to elevate the 
probability that listeners will act on criminal advocacy. 
 The proposed incitement scale delivers a more transparent and 
rational basis for evaluating the risks associated with specific speech acts 
than the hodge-podge of folk theories currently circulating in First 
Amendment law. It does, however, raise the question of the appropriate 
relationship between law and social science. After Brown cited 
psychological research to reject the notion of “separate but equal,” there 
emerged a voluminous literature on the place of social science in law, and 
space constraints do not allow us to review it comprehensively.218 Our 
 
213 See supra Subsection I.D. 
214 See supra Section II.D. 
215 See supra Section II.E. 
216 See Paul Horwitz, Free Speech as Risk Analysis: Heuristics, Biases, and Institutions in 
the First Amendment, 76 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (2003) (proposing an application of behavioral 
analysis to risk in First Amendment law).  
217 For a summary chart, see supra Appendix. Susan Benesch presents her own matrix for 
direct and public incitement to genocide. See Susan Benesch, Vile Crime or Inalienable 
Right: Defining Incitement to Genocide, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 485, 493-94 (2008) (proposing a 
new spectrum and definition for evaluating indictment to genocide). Her matrix is a dramatic 
improvement on what came before in the international law of direct and public incitement to 
commit genocide. Our matrix differs from hers in two respects: it is informed by social 
research and it focuses on Brandenburg and U.S. law rather than international criminal law. 
See also Richard Ashby Wilson, Inciting Genocide with Words, 36 MICH. J. INT’L L. 277, 
300-04 (2015) (evaluating Benesch’s framework). 
218 See generally Rachel F. Moran, What Counts as Knowledge? A Reflection on Race, Social 
Science, and the Law, 44 L. & SOC’Y REV. 515 (2010) (reviewing social science in the law 
since Brown). 
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sympathies are with legal scholars such as Cass Sunstein who embrace 
behavioral research and aspire to make government logical.219  
It is worth noting that risk assessment based on behavioral research is 
already an existing component of the criminal justice system and shapes judicial 
decisions on a daily basis.220 Although not an incitement case, Harper v. Poway 
Unified School District cited numerous social science studies to justify the 
decision that a high school could suspend a student for wearing a T-shirt with a 
message expressing religious condemnation of homosexuality.221 The statistical 
evidence Harper cited was particularly compelling: “[A]mong teenage victims of 
anti-gay discrimination, 75% experienced a decline in academic performance, 
39% had truancy problems and 28% dropped out of school.”222  
 The Ninth Circuit concluded that “Harper’s wearing of his T-shirt 
‘colli[des] with the rights of other students’ in the most fundamental way,”223 
citing eight studies that demonstrate that verbal attacks on students because of 
their sexual orientation lead to a significant and measurable decline in future 
academic performance and their potential success in later life.224 Subsequently, 
the passage of Harper citing relevant social science studies has been reproduced 
verbatim in Gillman, another First Amendment case.225 While our advocacy of 
the relevance of social science to legal problems is robust, our approach is 
cautious and prudent, and we advise a limited application of our ten-point 
incitement scale. The matrix only applies to the imminence and probability 
prongs of the three-part Brandenburg test, after it has been established that 
there is advocacy of imminent lawless action.  
 Furthermore, the objection might be raised that the matrix contemplates 
a review of the status of the speaker and the content of their message as relevant 
contextual factors, and in Citizens United and Reed v. Town of Gilbert, the U.S. 
 
219 Cass R. Sunstein, Making Government Logical, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 19, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/20/opinion/sunday/cass-sunstein-making-government-
logicalhtml.html [https://perma.cc/9C8R-26FK]; see also NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, 
USING SCIENCE AS EVIDENCE IN PUBLIC POLICY (Kenneth Prewitt et al. eds., 2012) 
(discussing the use of behavioral research in federal agency programs). 
220 See JOHN MONAHAN & LAURENS WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 398-409 (7th ed. 2010) (discussing the uses of social science in the 
determination of future facts). For a critical view of prediction in criminal law, see also 
Sandra G. Mayson, Collateral Consequences and the Preventive State, 91 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 301, 303-04 (2015) (providing a critical view of the uses of social science in the 
determination of future facts, especially in a criminal law context). 
221 Harper v. Poway Unified School Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1178-79, 1184 (9th Cir. 2006).  
222 Id. at 1179.  
223 Id. at 1178 (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969)). 
224 Id. at 1179. 
225 Gillman v. Sch. Bd. for Holmes Cty., Fla., 567 F. Supp. 2d 1359, 1370 (N.D. Fla. 2008). 
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Supreme Court countenances neither content-viewpoint discrimination nor 
speaker-identifying factors in First Amendment analysis.226  
 With respect to possible content or viewpoint discrimination, our scale 
does not replace existing tests for criminal advocacy. The risk assessment 
matrix is only pertinent once it has been established that the speech in question 
advocates a crime. Furthermore, the three content-related factors in the matrix 
all contain a call to violence, speech that is already prohibited under existing 
law of true threat and incitement. The factors are therefore consistent with 
prevailing prohibitions on criminal advocacy. Additionally, we advise that the 
presence of one or more factors is not in itself predictive of imminent lawless 
action. Instead, it is the ensemble of factors that may be jointly sufficient. The 
presence of one to three factors indicates low risk, four to six factors indicates 
medium risk and seven to ten factors indicates high risk. Thus, the matrix can 
be exculpatory as well as inculpatory. 
 With respect to speaker-identifying factors, consideration of the 
speaker’s corporate identity was permissible for many years on the basis of 
Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, which allowed the regulation of 
corporate funding of elections from general funds to prevent the appearance 
of corruption in politics.227 While space does not allow us to develop the 
argument here, we favor the approach adopted in Austin, which was overruled 
by Citizens United, a decision that has generated more negative comment 
than most. That being said, the reasons given by the Court for excluding 
consideration of the speaker’s identity in Citizens United are not present in 
our matrix. That decision states that courts cannot restrict political speech on 
the basis of the speaker’s corporate identity,228 but our scale does not specify 
any identity, corporate or otherwise. Nor may the government distinguish 
between speakers as a way of controlling content according to Citizens 
United,229 but our scale does not seek to suppress content via a speaker’s identity.  
Finally, Citizens United holds that government restrictions may not 
disfavor certain types of speakers,230 but our scale also does not do that; it 
simply notes that the more authoritative, credible and charismatic speakers 
are for their audience (i.e., regardless of ideological viewpoint or their 
specific political party membership), the more likely it is that their words will 
 
226 See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 315 (2010) (opining that 
political speech may not be banned on the basis of the speaker’s identity); see also Reed v. 
Town of Gilbert, Ariz., 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2222 (2015) (holding that laws restricting speech 
based on its content are presumptively unconstitutional); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 
505 U.S. 377, 395 (1992) (stating that laws regulating speech must be content neutral). 
227 Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 668 (1990). 
228 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 315. 
229 Id. at 312. 
230 Id. at 313-14. 
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influence audience behavior. In our view, it is impossible to evaluate a speech 
act in its context and the probability that it will provoke imminent lawless 
action without considering the attributes of a speaker and his or her 
relationship with an audience. Such analysis is compatible with, and indeed, 
demanded by, existing First Amendment jurisprudence. 
 Research on the effects of speech on listeners has made enormous 
strides since Brandenburg was decided in 1969, and we know much more 
about the ways that directly inciting speech can impact behavior than before. 
The next Section of this Article offers an incitement scale of ten factors to 
assist courts and policymakers as they assess the risk that an incitement could 
lead to imminent lawless action. It distills the most up-to-date behavioral and 
social research on persuasion, political communication and denigrating 
speech into a checklist that can be operationalized by legal actors.  
 
A. The Attributes of the Speaker 
 
1. The speaker occupies an official position of authority within 
government or a political party or political movement.  
 
If an authority figure exhorts violence or other persons appear to 
accept violent exhortations, then a majority of individual listeners will 
likely conform to the authority’s message, even if they disagree with it. 
The power of an authority figure’s words was clearly demonstrated in 
Milgram’s famous experiments in which otherwise normal and empathetic 
individuals (“teachers”) would obey an authority’s instructions to 
administer seemingly deadly electrical shocks to innocent victims 
(“learners”).231 For decades, psychologists asked “Would people still obey 
today?” Burger replicated Milgram’s results in 2009, finding that nearly 
three-quarters of participants delivered “shocks” as instructed.232 In recent 
variation on Milgram’s study, Mermillod and colleagues found that most 
participants comply with an authority’s destructive requests, such as 
insulting another person, even when there is little or no pressure to do 
so.233 Focusing on the underlying cognition of obedience, Grzyb and 
colleagues discovered that obedience to an authority can be elicited with 
as little as the would-be follower sharing an aspect of the authority’s social 
 
231 See Stanley Milgram, Liberating Effects of Group Pressure, 1 J. PERSONALITY AND SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 127, 134 (1965) (discussing obedience to authority figures and the moderating 
role of group conformity). 
232 Jerry M. Burger, Replicating Milgram: Would People Still Obey Today?, 64 AM. 
PSYCHOLOGIST 1, 8 (2009).  
233 Martial Mermillod et al., Destructive Obedience Without Pressure: Beyond the Limits of 
the Agentic State, 46 SOC. PSYCHOL. 345, 350 (2015). 
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identity, such as gender, or possessing a high need for cognitive closure 
(i.e., desire to remove ambiguity from the world).234  
These findings extend to numerous studies of social groups. In 
Asch’s experiments on intragroup behavior, many participants submitted 
to the collective’s patently false beliefs about the world if they were 
outnumbered or under the observation of an authority figure.235 
Zimbardo’s famous Stanford Prison Experiment elicited similar behavior 
when participants (“guards”) physically abused others (“prisoners”) or 
conformed to an authority figure’s instructions to control prisoners.236 In 
a real-world scenario, Straus recently analyzed twenty-four cases of mass 
violence in Africa, discovering that the most critical factor in each case 
was government authorities who encouraged violence and also 
coordinated it through their speech acts.237 Other recent studies on mass 
violence corroborate Straus’s findings and show that the greater the 
authority of the speaker, the more likely a community will conform to the 
individuals verbal instructions to commit violent acts.238  
 
2. The speaker is perceived by supporters as credible or charismatic. 
 
Whereas authority is associated with an individual’s formal position 
in a social hierarchy, credibility is a communicative construct that derives 
from a leader’s personal qualities such as expertise, relatability, and 
trustworthiness. To be effective, a credible group leader must also balance 
multiple commitments while signaling dedication to his or her base,239 
 
234 See generally Tomasz Grzyb et al., Cognitive Structuring and Obedience Toward 
Authority, 135 PERSONALITY & INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCE 115 (2018) (discussing personal 
traits that make individuals susceptible to obedience to authority). 
235 See Solomon E. Asch, Opinions and Social Pressure, 193 SCI. AM. 31, 32-33 (1955) 
(discussing social conformity to the opinions of others).  
236 See generally Craig Haney, Curtis Banks & Philip Zimbardo, Interpersonal Dynamics in 
A Simulated Prison, 1 INT’L J. CRIMINOLOGY & PENOLOGY 69 (1973); Phil Banyard, 
Tyranny and the Tyrant: From Stanford to Abu Ghraib, 20 THE PSYCHOLOGIST 494, 494 
(2007) (discussing film footage of the experiment that shows Zimbardo behaving as an 
authority figure, demanding that the guards restrict the prisoners’ freedom, a demand to 
which they conformed). 
237 SCOTT STRAUS, MAKING AND UNMAKING NATIONS: WAR, LEADERSHIP, AND GENOCIDE 
IN MODERN AFRICA 92, 99 (2015).  
238 SARAH SORIAL, SEDITION AND THE ADVOCACY OF VIOLENCE: FREE SPEECH AND 
COUNTER-TERRORISM 2, 84-85, 115-16 (2012).  
239 See generally Richard J.B. Bosworth & Joseph A. Maiolo, Introduction to Volume II, and 
Introduction to Part I, in 2 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR 1-20, 
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usually through making politically appropriate promises and delivering on 
them, while also not benefiting other groups more.240 This raises the question 
of how leaders maintain credibility while leading their group into conflict. 
Leaders in conflict situations or societies with a history of intractable 
conflicts often frame precarious circumstances in culturally salient ways that 
resonate with their followers.241 As an illustration, Benford and Snow’s 
review of conflicts and social movements revealed that leaders who sustain 
their credibility are often those who speak with a “narrative fidelity,” such that 
their words reinforce their group’s ideologies and myths.242  
While credibility promotes trust, a leader’s charisma provides him or her 
with power, and even the perception of having spiritual, if not magical-like 
abilities, by his or her followers.243 Even when lacking expertise, communicators 
who have charisma—perceived authenticity, honesty, and physical presence—
can attain positions of authority and become quite persuasive, especially during 
periods of crisis or rapid social change.244 As Weber observed, charismatic 
leaders often attract followers full of “enthusiasm, or of despair and hope.”245 
Since charismatic leaders often contest traditional or bureaucratic authorities, 
they can typically break with established norms.246 Despite breaking traditional 
norms, charismatic leaders are often highly successful and persuasive because 
they are masters of nonverbal and verbal communication. For instance, they 
 
(Michael Geyer & Adam Tooze eds., 2015) (addressing the role of leaders and their signaled 
devotion to constituents when discussing the role of ideological commitments in the World 
War II); Roseanne W. McManus, Making it Personal: The Role of Leader-Specific Signals 
in Extended Deterrence, 80 J. POL. 982, 982-95 (2018) (discussing the balance leaders must 
strike between signaling commitments to their own country and weaker states). 
240 See, e.g., James H. Read & Ian Shapiro, Transforming Power Relationships: Leadership, 
Risk, and Hope, 108 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 40, 45-47 (2014) (using the case study of Mandela 
and de Klerk to illustrate the importance of their credibility and risk-taking in leading their 
constituencies to a peaceful solution in South Africa).  
241 See Stuart J. Kaufman, Symbols, Frames, and Violence: Studying Ethnic War in the 
Philippines, 55 INT'L. STUD. Q. 937, 943-46 (2011); see also Daniel Bar-Tal, Neta Oren, & 
Rafi Nets-Zehngut, Sociopsychological Analysis of Conflict-Supporting Narratives: A 
General Framework, 51 J. PEACE RES. 662-75 (2014) (analyzing the recurrence of conflict-
supporting narratives that draw upon culturally accepted stories or frames to justify 
intergroup conflicts and thereby satisfy the basic psychological needs of the collective). 
242 See Robert D. Benford & David A. Snow, Framing Processes and Social Movements: An 
Overview and Assessment, ANN. REV. SOC. 611, 622 (2000). 
243 See generally S. Abbruzzese, Charisma: Social Aspects of, in 8 INTERNATIONAL 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL & BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 1653 (Paul B. Baltes & Neil J. 
Smelser eds., 2001); Caitlin Andrews-Lee, The Revival of Charisma: Experimental Evidence 
from Argentina and Venezuela, 52 COMP. POL. STUD. 688-95 (2019); Yasmeen Yousif 
Pardesi & Yousif Pardesi, Charismatic Leadership: A Critical Analysis, 2 GOV. ANN. RES. 
J. POL. SCI. 71-76 (2013). 
244 MAX WEBER, ON CHARISMA AND INSTITUTION BUILDING 49, xiv-lvi, 18-27, 254-57 (1968). 
245 Id at 49. 
246 Id. at 24. 
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often modulate radically the volume and tempo of their speeches.247 
Additionally, charismatic leaders frame their goals in terms of the success of the 
ingroup,248 using “us” and “them” rhetoric and stressing the vital importance of 
giving oneself to the group. 249 The latter is known as “ego surrender” and is a 
common appeal made by charismatic leaders of sociopolitical movements, as 
well as religious communities and cults, which encourage followers to find 
purpose and meaning in surrendering to the group and, by extension, the leader.  
 
3. The speaker has regular access to means of mass communication, 
or the ability to control information, or to suppress alternative 
sources of information. 
 
Since Arendt’s The Origins of Totalitarianism,250 scholars have 
advanced the claim that authoritarian leaders seek to control information by 
hindering alternative political voices, while totalitarians strive to exercise 
personal and absolute control over information.251 A leader may suppress 
alternative sources of information indirectly by placing party loyalists in official 
positions overseeing mass communication or directly by attacking the news 
media, including encouraging attacks on dissenting journalists.252 For Maynard 
 
247 Oliver Niebuhr, Jana Voße & Alexander Brem, What Makes a Charismatic Speaker? A 
Computer-Based Acoustic-Prosodic Analysis of Steve Jobs’ Tone of Voice, 64 COMPUTERS 
HUM. BEHAV. 366, 376-78 (2016).  
248 See generally Saul L. Miller, Jon K. Maner, & D. Vaughn Becker, Self-Protective Biases 
in Group Categorization: Threat Cues Shape the Psychological Boundary Between “Us” 
and “Them,” 99 J. PERSONALITY SOC. PSYCHOL. 62-77 (2010) (addressing the vulnerability 
of groups to engage in bias toward others from outgroup categorization); Henri Tajfel, Social 
Identity and Intergroup Behavior, 13 SOC. SCI. INFO. 65 (1974) (providing a general 
definition of “in-group” for the social sciences as a group of people who see themselves as 
sharing an identity and interest, and generally a sense of otherness or exclusivity as regards 
all nonmembers of the group. An out-group is any group of people who are seen as not 
belonging to the in-group of the speaker and his or her primary audience).  
249 See Loretta S. Wilson & Susan Kwileck, Are These People Crazy, or What? A Rational 
Choice Interpretation of Cults and Charisma, 19 HUMANOMICS  29, 30 (2003). 
250 See generally HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM (Harcourt 1973) 
(explaining how the roots of totalitarianism lie in a strong leader’s charisma, ideology, and 
ability to sweep a people under the total arm of a regime by promising a utopia, while 
authoritarianism centers on total power).  
251 See, e.g., JUAN J. LINZ, TOTALITARIAN AND AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES 67-70 (2000) (contrasting 
the methods by which authoritarian and totalitarian regimes seek to control their population).  
252 NATASHA EZROW & ERICA FRANTZ, DICTATORS AND DICTATORSHIPS: UNDERSTANDING 
AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES AND THEIR LEADERS 9-10, 192-93, 223 (2011) (addressing how 
the structure and effects of political regimes leaning towards or embracing dictatorship share 
the characteristic of elites mutually profiting from abuse and corruption such as controling 
or monopolizing the media and military).  
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and Benesch, potentially dangerous leaders are those who attempt to control or 
erode systems of alternative information, since this practice correlates with 
violent regimes and is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for genocide.253 
For instance, in a survey of over one hundred states from 1960 to 1999, Smith 
found that authoritarian repression, including stifling alternative sources of 
information, correlates with political violence unless a regime has a durable 
natural resource such as oil.254 
Most countries have moral and legal injunctions against interpersonal 
violence, 255 but if citizens hear repeated exhortations from their leaders to 
commit violence against an outgroup, they may conclude that the usual strictures 
have been lifted. Moreover, persons may weigh the consequences of their 
involvement and come to believe that such violence is justified, necessary, and 
likely to go unpunished. Repetitive antisemitic exhortations in multiple domains 
of media contributed to the Nazification of Europe in the 1930s.256 Joseph 
Goebbels, the Nazi Minister of Propaganda, and Walther Schulze-Wechsungen, 
another prominent Nazi propagandist, effectively promoted the repetition of 
Nazi ideology as the key to propagandizing the masses. 257 Indeed, mass violence 
against a recognizable civilian population is often preceded by a sustained media 
campaign that repeats messages of hatred and/or violence.258 Exposure to 
repeated messages often creates the illusion that the message is, in fact, true.259 
 
253 Jonathan Leader Maynard & Susan Benesch, Dangerous Speech and Dangerous 
Ideology: An Integrated Model for Monitoring and Prevention, 9 GENOCIDE STUD. & 
PREVENTION 70, 83 (2016); see also Susan Benesch, The New Law of Incitement to 
Genocide: A Critique and a Proposal, DANGEROUS SPEECH PROJECT 9-10 (Apr. 1, 2009), 
https://dangerouspeech.org/new-law-of-incitement-to-genocide/ [https://perma.cc/GZ9B-
TX9S] (laying out Benesch’s preconditions for incitement to genocide).  
254 See Benjamin Smith, Oil Wealth and Regime Survival in the Developing World, 1960–
1999, 48 AM. J. POL. SCI. 232, 234, 241 (2004) (“Highly authoritarian regimes actually 
experienced considerably higher levels of protest than did others… [but] mechanisms other 
than repression drive the relative respite from protest that oil-rich states enjoy.”).  
255 By moral injunction we mean a societal imperative informed by a sacred text or accepted 
standard of conduct that resembles an ethical or social normative imperative, while by legal 
injunction we mean criminal or civil rules that compel or prohibit behavior.  
256 Nico Voigtländer & Hans-Joachim Voth, Nazi Indoctrination and Anti-Semitic Beliefs in 
Germany, 112 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 7931, 7931 (2015). 
257 See NICHOLAS O’SHAUGHNESSY, SELLING HITLER: PROPAGANDA AND THE NAZI BRAND 
102-08 (2016) (discussing how part of the Nazi theory of mass persuasion involved 
repetition, as valued by its highest propagandists, including Goebbels and Schulze-
Wechsungen).  
258 See, e.g., GARTH S. JOWETT & VICTORIA O’DONNELL, PROPAGANDA AND PERSUASION 46 
(5th ed. 2012) (describing how political leaders incited inter-ethnic hatred in the 1991–1995 
Balkans conflict). 
259 See generally Lisa K. Fazio et al., Knowledge Does Not Protect Against Illusory Truth, 
144 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 993 (2015) (discussing the effects that repeated statements 
have on the illusion of truth). 
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Exposure to repeated messages also decreases the likelihood in which listeners 
are able to discern whether the speaker or media source is disseminating false 
information.260  
A free media is vital not only for democratic processes but also for 
sustained peace. The less control a leader has over the means of 
communication, the more likely the public will discover and respond to the 
leader’s injustices and thereby remove him or her from office.261 More 
critically, the more a leader controls the means of communication, the more 
it strengthens his or her regime 262 and, during times of state weakness, the 
greater the likelihood of armed conflict.263 In these moments, leaders who 
control information and have a ready outlet for their own messages often 
distract the public from their misdeeds, such as appropriating resources for 
themselves or dividing the public against any political opposition.264  
 
B. The Content of the Message 
 
1. The speaker’s message contains explicit or implicit calls for 
violent acts against members of an outgroup. 
 
Yanagizawa-Drott provides compelling evidence that explicit calls 
for violence on RTLM radio had a significant impact on the Rwandan 
genocide, concluding that: “the main radio station broadcasting anti-Tutsi 
propaganda during the Rwandan genocide significantly increased 
participation … [by] approximately 10% overall.”265 However, advocates of 
violence seldom use direct language, and coded or euphemistic speech is 
 
260 See generally Jason D. Ozubko & Jonathan Fugelsang, Remembering Makes Evidence 
Compelling: Retrieval from Memory Can Give Rise to the Illusion of Truth, 37 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. LEARNING, MEMORY & COGNITION 270 (2011) (discussing how 
repeated messages create an illusion of truth due to the fluency in retrieved information from 
memory).  
261 See generally Joan E. Cho, Jae Seung Lee & B.K. Song, Media Exposure and Regime 
Support Under Competitive Authoritarianism: Evidence from South Korea, 17 J.E. ASIAN 
STUD. 145 (2017) (discussing media control and authoritarian rule in South Korea under Park 
Chung Hee).  
262 Id. at 148-49.  
263 See Edward D. Mansfield & Jack Snyder, Democratic Transitions, Institutional Strength, 
and War, 56 INT’L ORG. 297, 298-99 (2002) (discussing the unique opportunities for armed 
conflict during the democratization process). 
264 See JACK SNYDER, FROM VOTING TO VIOLENCE: DEMOCRATIZATION AND NATIONALIST 
CONFLICT 56 (2000) (describing the conditions within democratizing societies that foster the 
acceptance of nationalist ideas). 
265 David Yanagizawa-Drott, Propaganda and Conflict: Evidence from the Rwandan 
Genocide, 129 Q.J. ECON. 1947, 1989 (2014).  
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more the norm. Jean Paul Akayesu, for instance, incited mass violence 
against Tutsis, who he called inyenzi (“cockroaches”),266 using the expression 
“go to work,” which meant “go kill the Tutsis and Hutu political 
opponents.”267 Coded or implicit speech relies upon the linguistic and cultural 
competency of members of the ingroup, including symbolic and nonlinguistic 
background information, allowing only cultural insiders to infer what the 
speaker intends.268  
For example, an international tribunal found in 2018 that Serb 
nationalist politician Vojislav Šešelj instigated persecution (including 
forcible displacement and deportation) of Croatians in the Yugoslav Wars 
using coded speech particular to Serb nationalism that contained ethnic 
and religious slurs and asserted an imaginary boundary of Serbian territory 
(viz. “The Karlobag-Karlovac-Ogulin-Virovitica Line”).269 When 
compared to direct speech, indirect speech may have an equally powerful, 
but more subtle, effect on audiences. In a series of experiments, Eerland 
and colleagues observed that participants vividly remembered direct 
speech after exposure, while indirect speech was not easily recalled but 
participants still showed signs of having encoded the speech’s message 
into memory.270 Similarly, Gubler and Kalmoe found that citizens of Israel 
and India exposed to indirect calls for violence showed a significant 
increase in support for policies harming the outgroup.271 Remarkably, 
these effects even influenced persons with low outgroup prejudice and low 
aggressive personality traits, and persisted even when persons were 
presented with speeches in favor of helping the outgroup.272 Accordingly, 
 
266 Prosecutor v. Ruggiu, ICTR-97-32-I, Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 44(iii) (June 1, 2000). 
267 Id. at ¶ 44(iv).  
268 John Searle, Indirect Speech Acts, in 3 SYNTAX & SEMANTICS 60-61 (Peter Cole & Jerry 
L. Morgan eds., 1975).  
269 Prosecutor v. Vojislav Šešelj, MICT -16-99-A, Appeals Proceeding, ¶129-30, 166 (April 
11, 2018); see also Anthony Oberschall, Propaganda, Hate Speech and Mass Killings, in 
PROPAGANDA, WAR CRIMES TRIALS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: FROM SPEAKERS’ CORNERS 
TO WAR CRIMES 171-200 (Predrag Dojčinović ed., 2012) (analyzing propaganda techniques 
for inciting mass violence and documenting how Šešelj’s propaganda likely incited mass violence 
in the Yugoslav Wars). See generally ANTHONY OBERSCHALL, VOJISLAV ŠEŠELJ’S NATIONALIST 
PROPAGANDA: CONTENTS, TECHNIQUES, AIMS AND IMPACTS, 1990–1994. (2006), http://www. 
baginst.org/uploads/1/0/4/8/10486668/vojislav_seseljs_nationalist_propaganda-_contents_tech-
niques_aims_and_impacts.pdf [https://perma.cc/W2WS-PW5U] (providing an overview of 
techniques of mass persuasion used by history’s most notorious propagandists to induce the 
acceptance of or participation in mass violence, and discussing how Šešelj’s propaganda 
parallels mass persuasion intended to incite mass violence).  
270 Anita Eerland, Jan A. Engelen & Rolf A. Zwaan, The Influence of Direct and Indirect 
Speech on Mental Representations, 8 PLOS ONE, June 12, 2013, at 1, 6, 8.  
271 Joshua R. Gubler & Nathan P. Kalmoe, Violent Rhetoric in Protracted Group Conflicts: 
Experimental Evidence from Israel and India, 68 POL. RES. Q. 651, 651-52 (2015).  
272 Id. at 661.  
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indirect language may be just as effective if not more effective than direct 
language in promoting prejudice or harm against an outgroup.  
 
2. The message dehumanizes an outgroup, or expresses disgust for 
an outgroup, or calls for acts of revenge against an outgroup. 
 
In law, dehumanizing language is often seen as the most egregious 
form of hate speech, a view with origins in the Nuremberg trials, and 
especially the verdict against Nazi propagandist Julius Streicher who 
“termed the Jew a germ and a pest, not a human being, but ‘a parasite, an 
enemy, an evil-doer, a disseminator of diseases who must be destroyed in 
the interest of mankind.’”273 Dower, writing about the conduct of war in 
the Pacific during the Second World War, famously opined: “The 
dehumanization of the Other contributed immeasurably to the 
psychological distancing that facilitates killing.”274 Waldron places a 
strong emphasis on language that characterizes members of other racial 
groups as “bestial or subhuman.”275 Further, psychological studies have 
shown that dehumanizing language predicts intergroup violence.276 This 
view of the deleterious effects of dehumanizing language is the accepted 
and arguably standard model of hate speech. U.S. courts convicting 
individuals of hate crimes have emphasized the dehumanizing language of 
defendants, and in the 2018 case of the three Kansas men convicted of a 
plot to bomb Somali immigrants, the court heard how one defendant 
referred to Muslims as “cockroaches” and to himself as the “Orkin man,” 
referencing a pest extermination company.277 
 
273 BETH VAN SCHAACK & RONALD C. SLYE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS 
ENFORCEMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS 883 (Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 2d ed. 2010). 
274 JOHN W. DOWER, WAR WITHOUT MERCY: RACE AND POWER IN THE PACIFIC WAR 11 (1986).  
275 JEREMY WALDRON, THE HARM IN HATE SPEECH 66 (2012).  
276 See generally Lasana T. Harris & Susan T. Fiske, Dehumanizing the Lowest of the Low: 
Neuroimaging Responses to Extreme Out-Groups, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 847 (2006) (discussing 
the propensity of dehumanization to lower empathy for an outgroup); Tage S. Rai, Piercarlo 
Valdesolo & Jesse Graham, Dehumanization Increases Instrumental Violence, but Not 
Moral Violence, 114 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 8511 (2017) (analyzing experimental effects 
of dehumanization and finding that dehumanizing language enables violence that 
perpetrators see as wrong but necessary). 
277 See Mitch Smith, Kansas Trio Convicted in Plot to Bomb Somali Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 18, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/18/us/kansas-militia-somali-trial-
verdict.html [https://perma.cc/FPU7-FB2C] (reporting on a jury trial in which the 
government argued unsuccessfully that the First Amendment protected defendants’ 
dehumanizing speech). 
 Journal of Law & Public Affairs  [Jan. 2020 
 
   
 
106 
Disgust is a central element of moral reasoning and regulating social 
behavior generally,278 and can be mobilized by certain speakers to 
dehumanize the outgroup. Higher order cognition, such as the executive 
functions in normal human interactions with other persons, exhibit low levels 
of disgust, as opposed to human interactions with polluting substances, such 
as human waste and corpses, which are inanimate and typically elicit high 
levels of disgust.279 When feelings of disgust are elicited toward other people, 
ordinary projection of an imagined other who possesses a mind and human 
feeling is reduced. The result is a dismissal of the agency, intentionality, and 
subjectivity of the target of disgust.280 According to Harris and Fiske, when 
persons project low warmth and incompetence onto a stigmatized group, such 
as the disabled, the poor, drug addicts and immigrants, they also experience 
high levels of disgust, thus indicating that perceptions of low warmth and 
incompetency go hand-in-hand with disgust and dehumanization.281 Therefore, 
speech acts that portray an outgroup with disgust-inducing stimuli, such as pests 
or diseases, can stimulate feelings of social disengagement toward the outgroup.  
Revenge is a powerful psychological motivation for intra- and 
intergroup conflict because it has been naturally selected to deter or 
discourage future conspecific threats, to preclude transgressions, and to 
reinforce social cooperation.282 These functions of revenge are evident in 
studies of punishment and cooperation in game theoretical simulations.283 
Studies also show that ingroup members experience a vicarious sense of 
moral justification when retribution is carried out on members of an outgroup 
for assault or provocation.284 In an experiment using Serb nationalist Vojislav 
Šešelj’s speeches, Lillie et al. discovered that revenge speech lowered the 
propensity of participants to empathize with the outgroup and increased their 
willingness to justify violence morally.285 Moreover, revenge speech 
consolidated ingroup identity to the same extent as highly nationalistic 
 
278 See HAIDT, supra note 197, at 21-26 (describing a cross-cultural study in which 
participants found “harmless-taboo violations [are] universally wrong” even if no one is 
harmed by the violations).  
279See Harris & Fiske, supra note 275, at 852 (finding lower medial prefrontal cortex activity 
and higher levels of disgust when participants were shown pictures of extreme outgroups 
that were consistent with the way they viewed objects).  
280 Id. at 848.  
281 Id. at 852.  
282 See MICHAEL E. MCCULLOUGH, BEYOND REVENGE: THE EVOLUTION OF THE 
FORGIVENESS INSTINCT 49 (2008) (discussing revenge as an evolutionary adaptation).  
283 Id. at 99-103.  
284 Brian Lickel et al., Vicarious Retribution: The Role of Collective Blame in Intergroup 
Aggression, 10 PERSONALITY SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 372, 386 (2006).  
285 Jordan Kiper et al., Propaganda, Empathy and Support for Intergroup Violence: the Moral 
Psychology of International Speech Crimes 18-19 (Mar. 20, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2580521 [https://perma.cc/S2A9-Z2Y8]. 
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rhetoric.286 Recently, Böhm, Rusch, and Gürerk found that the most direct 
and causal motivation for revenge was the felt need to protect the group, so 
much so that groups often opt for preemptive force when they believe that 
they are victims.287 Such findings are supported by postconflict 
ethnographies, such as Mamdani’s, which found that deep-seated notions of 
victimhood and revenge motivated many Hutu genocidaires.288  
 
3. The message identifies a direct threat to the ingroup and identifies 
a clear and foreseeably violent course of action that can be 
imminently taken by listeners to remove the source of the threat. 
 
For political entrepreneurs, a time-honored strategy for mobilizing 
supporters is manufacturing indignation about a problem and mobilizing 
collective action to address it. Yet, unlike ordinary political entrepreneurs, 
authority figures who incite hatred engage in what George calls “contentious 
collective action,” in which a speaker convinces followers that they are 
wronged by a group and justified in taking action against them.289 
Furthermore, the speaker cultivates feelings of righteous indignation around 
a master narrative, which often draws from the ingroup’s religion or 
worldview, making contentious collective action appear morally right.290  
 While mob violence and spurious attacks could ensue from such 
contentious speech, it is not incitement unless the speaker openly advocates for 
the unlawful oppression of, or an explicit attack on, the vilified group.291 Rarely, 
though, is violence “sparked” by a single inciting speech, but rather stems from 
a combination of factors, including a speech event that draws from the narratives 
already cultivated by the speaker within his or her contentious movement.292 A 
 
286 Id. 
287 Robert Böhm, Hannes Rusch & Özgür Gürerk, What Makes People Go to War? Defensive 
Intentions Motivate Retaliatory and Preemptive Intergroup Aggression, 37 EVOLUTION & 
HUM. BEHAV. 29, 32-33 (2016).  
288 See MAHMOOD MAMDANI, WHEN VICTIMS BECOME KILLERS: COLONIALISM, NATIVISM, 
AND THE GENOCIDE IN RWANDA 32-33, 59, 259 (2001) (describing the history and formation 
of Hutu and Tutsi as political identities that laid the foundation for the Rwandan genocide).  
289 See Cherian George, Hate Spin: The Twin Political Strategies of Religious Incitement and 
Offense-Taking, 27 COMM. THEORY 156, 157-58 (2017) (developing the concept of “hate 
spin,” defined as “a twin political strategy of incitement and manufactured indignation, 
exploiting group identities to mobilize supporters and coerce opponents.”). 
290 Id. 
291 Id. at 159. 
292 See id. at 163 (arguing that the “spark” frame of hate speech is counterproductive to 
understanding and combatting religious intolerance); see also SIDNEY TARROW, POWER IN 
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relevant example here is terrorist speech: the messages used by a hate group or 
terrorist organization when recruiting, training, planning, financing, and 
coordinating its activities.293 At the core of terrorist speech is violent action, 
framed within a central narrative—an ideology that justifies violence on account 
of group threats or “fighting fire with fire” to achieve a political goal294—as 
advocated by the cell’s political entrepreneurs. Thus, when a leader calls for 
violence, would-be perpetrators are ready to act.295 
A study by Halperin, Canetti-Nisim and Hirsch-Hoefler found that the 
combination of group-based hatred with a sense of direct threat is one of the 
most significant antecedents for political intolerance and violence in Israel.296 
More broadly, a meta-analysis of psychological studies on ingroup threats 
and outgroup attitudes discovered that negative outgroup attitudes, such as 
hatred and distrust, were significantly influenced by realistic or symbolic 
threats posed by an outgroup.297 Such threats increase fears about an outgroup 
and support for aggressive policies toward them. A study by Weisel and 
Zultan, for example, found that a group under threat is more likely to 
contribute materially to a conflict when called upon by others to do so.298 
While threatening messages elicit fear, it is worth noting that fear is itself a 
complex and unpredictable response. Even if a person is genuinely frightened 
by a message, a shift in attitude alone is often not enough to create a 
behavioral change, since an affective and cognitive component is necessary 
for behavior.299 Consequentially, fear messages are most likely to enact 
 
MOVEMENT: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND CONTENTIOUS POLITICS 21 (2d ed. 1998) (“By 
drawing on inherited collective identities and shaping new ones, challengers delimit the 
boundaries of their respective constituencies and define their enemies. . . .”).  
293 See Steven Beale, Online Terrorist Speech, Direct Government Regulation, and the 
Communications Decency Act, 16 DUKE L. & TECH. REV., 333-34 (2018) (proposing 
modifications to the Communications Decency Act to better regulate terrorist hate speech on 
social media and online).  
294 See Kurt Braddock & John Horgan, Towards a Guide for Constructing and Disseminating 
Counternarratives to Reduce Support for Terrorism, 39 STUD. CONFLICT & TERRORISM 381, 
383 (2015) (describing the narrative form of terrorist messages).  
295 See Stephen Reicher & Alexander Haslam, Fueling Extremes, 27 SCI. AM. MIND 34, 39 
(2016) (discussing psychological behaviors in terrorist cells).  
296 Eran Halperin, Daphna Canetti-Nisim & Sivan Hirsch-Hoefler, The Central Role of 
Group-Based Hatred as an Emotional Antecedent of Political Intolerance: Evidence from 
Israel, 30 POL. PSYCHOL. 93, 115-16 (2009).  
297 Blake M. Riek, Eric W. Mania & Samuel L. Gaertner, Intergroup Threat and Outgroup 
Attitudes: A Meta-Analytic Review, 10 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 336, 349 (2006).  
298 Ori Weisel & Ro’i Zultan, Social Motives in Intergroup Conflict: Group Identity and 
Perceived Target of Threat, 90 EUR. ECON. REV. 122, 130 (2016).  
299 See Susan T. Fiske & Cydney Dupree, Gaining Trust as Well as Respect in 
Communicating to Motivated Audiences about Science Topics, 111 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 
13593, 13594 (2014) (evaluating perceptions of climate scientists as a potential barrier to 
public trust in their message). 
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behavioral changes when there is an identifiable path of action for the listener 
to take in order to remove the threat and, thus, the source of fear.300  
 
C. The Context of the Speech 
 
1. There is a history of intergroup conflict between the ingroup and 
outgroup, and the number of instances of intergroup violence has 
increased overall in the previous twelve months. 
 
A history of conflict between the ingroup and outgroup often precedes 
genocide and crimes against humanity and is likely to contribute to mass 
atrocities because of unresolved grievances, dysfunctional justice systems, 
land disputes, and competition over natural resources.301 Mamdani’s study of 
the role of victimhood in the Rwandan genocide302 has convinced scholars to 
focus on the combined effect of a history of conflict and a collective memory 
of victimhood as factors that indicate a susceptibility to incitement to 
genocide.303 A sense of collective victimhood is associated with increased 
feelings of vulnerability and mistrust, an expectation of hostility in the future and 
a fear of physical or symbolic annihilation; and it is also associated with reduced 
guilt and willingness to forgive the outgroup.304 Accordingly, groups with a 
history of conflict and an ingroup having a collective memory of victimization 
are more likely than others to support aggression towards the outgroup.305  
When small-scale intergroup conflict increases, violence becomes 
more likely because, in general, there is a decrease in the quality of intergroup 
contact, and the ingroup is less likely to oppose leaders who wish to place 
restrictions on the outgroup in the name of self-defense.306 For example, 
 
300 RICHARD M. PERLOFF, THE DYNAMICS OF PERSUASION: COMMUNICATION AND ATTITUDES 
IN THE 21ST CENTURY 200-01 (4th ed. 2010) (discussing the behavioral changes caused by fear 
in circumstances where “people perceive that they are capable of averting the threat”). 
301 Leader Maynard & Benesch, supra note 252, at 78.  
302 MAMDANI, supra note 287. 
303 See generally Noa Schori-Eyal et al., The Shadows of the Past: Effects of Historical Group 
Trauma on Current Intergroup Conflicts, 43 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 538 
(2017) (discussing associations between collective memories of trauma, victimhood, and 
enduring group violence).  
304 Id. at 538.  
305 Id. at 540 (arguing that perpetual ingroup victim orientation “entails a commitment to the 
defense of the ingroup, and consequently greater support for aggressive measures against 
enemy outgroups”). 
306 Justin T. Pickett et al., Contact and Compromise: Explaining Support for Conciliatory 
Measures in the Context of Violent Intergroup Conflict, 51 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 585, 
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Pettigrew and Tropp’s meta-analysis of over 500 studies on group 
interactions found that increased prejudice and violence toward an outgroup 
strongly correlated with diminished intergroup contact.307 Given that frequent 
intergroup contact reduces the likelihood of mass violence and increased 
conflicts or perceived threats diminish intergroup contact, an increase in 
small-scale incidents of violence can render mass violence more imminent by 
reducing the mediating effects of intergroup conflict.308  
A widely accepted finding on retaliatory violence is that persons who 
are identity-fused with their group—i.e., see their personal and group identity 
as equivalent—are more likely than others to support or volunteer for 
violence against a seemingly perpetrating outgroup.309 For instance, studies 
of Israelis during the 2015 Palestinian “Stabbing Intifada”310 and Libyans 
during the 2011 revolution311 found that persons who felt fused with their 
group predicted endorsement of, or participation in violence. Persons who 
experience an exclusive sense of victimhood after an attack on their group—
i.e., that their group alone comprises true victims—are more likely to have 
strong negative intergroup attitudes.312 Given human cognitive capacity for 
revenge,313 retaliation in a nation-state or region can become especially 
dangerous, leading to a cycle of deepening group commitments and 
 
588, 591, 604-05 (2014) (describing how threat-oriented beliefs in a study of Israeli Arabs 
and Jews were associated with decreased support for compromise whereas high quality 
contact between those groups was associated with increased support for compromise).  
307 Thomas F. Pettigrew & Linda R. Tropp, A Meta-Analytic Test of Intergroup Contact 
Theory, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 751, 766 (2006). 
308 Ananthi Al Ramiah & Miles Hewstone, Intergroup Contact as a Tool for Reducing, 
Resolving, and Preventing Intergroup Conflict, 68 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 527, 531-32 (2013).  
309 Leah A. Fredman, Brock Bastian & William B. Swann, God or Country? Fusion with 
Judaism Predicts Desire for Retaliation Following Palestinian Stabbing Intifada, 8 SOC. 
PSYCHOL. & PERSONALITY SCI. 882, 882-83, 885 (2017) (“[I]dentity fusion has been 
implicated in conflicts in the Middle East. For example, strongly fused persons were 
especially inclined to serve as front-line combatants during the 2011 Libyan revolution.”).  
310 Id. at 885.  
311 Harvey Whitehouse, Brian McQuinn, Michael Buhrmester & William B. Swann, Brothers 
in Arms: Libyan Revolutionaries Bond like Family, 111 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 17783, 
17784 (2014).  
312 See, e.g., Johanna Ray Vollhardt & Rezarta Bilali, The Role of Inclusive and Exclusive 
Victim Consciousness in Predicting Intergroup Attitudes: Findings from Rwanda, Burundi, 
and DRC, 36 POL. PSYCHOL. 489, 489-506 (2015) (examining the theories and evidence 
regarding victim consciousness and empirical support for the hypothesis that exclusive 
victimhood consciousness predicts negative intergroup attitudes, while inclusive victimhood 
predicts positive intergroup attitudes). 
313 See generally Michael E. McCullough, Robert Kurzban & Benjamin A. Tabak, Cognitive 
Systems for Revenge and Forgiveness, 36 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 1 (2013) (drawing from 
findings in cognitive science to posit that humans have a cognitive system for retaliation, 
which was selected to deter harm, and a cognitive system for computing relational costs, 
which can function to deter costly conflict). 
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escalating intergroup conflict.314 Such violence can lead to collective blame 
and vicarious retribution,315 and in the context of a civil war, weaken 
institutions and ultimately challenge the control of the State.316 
 
2. There is a major national political election in the next twelve 
months or there was a major national political election in the last 
twelve months. 
 
For any country, an election year is an important period, but for countries 
where elites vie for political dominance amid a system of corrupt and fraudulent 
politics, election years can witness dramatic spikes in violence. The spike is 
linked to the activity of militias, who often align themselves with armed wings 
of political parties in the run-up to elections.317 Under the guise of removing 
threatening regimes or protecting threats to the state, militias are often sought by 
politicians and loyalists to intimidate or attack political opponents, if not control 
entire regional populations.318 Numerous studies reveal, however, that 
coordinated attempts to intimidate political opponents do not cause the targeted 
communities to retreat from political participation but to engage in it more 
vigorously.319 Consequentially, intergroup tensions mount quickly, and violence 
can escalate as an instrument of political change.  
When election violence is “bottom-up,” it typically involves intermittent 
and minor clashes between groups of political oppositions, as witnessed in the 
U.S. 2016 presidential election race.320 Election violence is most violent, 
 
314 See, e.g., Robert S. Walker & Drew H. Bailey, Body Counts in Lowland South American 
Violence, 34 EVOLUTION & HUM. BEHAV. 29, 29-34 (2013) (analyzing violence in South 
American societies and finding that attacks become deadlier when revenge is involved, and that 
revenge raids become deadlier than the previous grievance, leading to cycles of violence).  
315 See Lickel et al., supra note 283 (providing a theoretical framework for the phenomenon 
of collective blame in which someone is attacked by virtue of their apparent shared identity 
with the original perpetrator).  
316 See Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, Transnational Dimensions of Civil War, 44 J. PEACE RES. 
293, 304 (2007) (finding “that countries recently involved in conflict or new states are 
substantially more likely to experience conflict”).  
317 Sabine C. Carey & Neil J. Mitchell, Progovernment Militias, 20 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 127, 
139 (2017).  
318 Id. at 132.  
319 See Sandra Ley, To Vote or Not to Vote: How Criminal Violence Shapes Electoral 
Participation, 62 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 1963, 1963-64 (2018) (discussing studies that show 
victims of political violence are more likely than nonvictims to participate in politics).  
320 See Cynthia Akwei, Mitigating Election Violence and Intimidation: A Political 
Stakeholder Engagement Approach, 46 POL. & POL’Y. 472, 491–92 (2018) (noting that these 
incidents were not just the conference attendees creating negative feelings on their own, but 
that the political candidates helping to incite bad feelings were not ruling governments and 
still part of the “top-down” process).  
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however, when it is “top-down” or sponsored by ruling governments who 
attempt to suppress oppositional groups, reduce political competition, and 
diminish voter turnout, thereby maintaining or even extending their political 
power.321 Although such top-down election violence often entails a victory for 
incumbents, their victory is usually temporary, as cycles of violence often follow 
with, for example, oppositional forces resorting to violence to discredit the 
government or incumbents further restricting peoples’ rights.  
To illustrate, a study by Hafner-Burton, Hyde, and Jablonski 
examined 458 elections from 1981 to 2004, finding that election violence 
increases the likelihood that incumbents remain in power, but also finding 
that their society is at a greater risk for longterm cycles of violence.322 Post-
election violence is often greater in magnitude than the initial pre-election 
violence;323 leading to enduring struggles over land resources, ethicized party 
formation, reduced voter turnout, declines in democracy and perceptions of 
insecurity;324 and even to journalistic self-censorship.325 Given the social 
volatility of elections, if a speaker incites violence during or soon after an 
election period, his or her words are likely to be effective.  
 
 
3. There is significant polarization of political organizations along 
religious, ethnic, or racial lines. 
 
Political polarization within a community or between communities is 
known to increase intolerance and violence.326 When schisms occur along 
religious,327 ethnic,328 or racial lines,329 communities can experience even 
 
321 Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, Susan D. Hyde & Ryan S. Jablonski, When Do Governments 
Resort to Election Violence?, 44 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 149, 150 (2013).  
322 Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, Susan D. Hyde, & Ryan S. Jablonski, Surviving Elections: 
Election Violence, Incumbent Victory and Post-Election Repercussions, 48 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 
459, 467, 482 (2018).  
323 See, e.g., Henrik Angerbrandt, Deadly Elections: Post-Election Violence in Nigeria, 56 J. 
MOD. AFR. STUD. 143, 144 (2018) (describing how violence in reaction to election results, 
such as those in Nigeria in 2011, can be of a much greater magnitude).  
324 Id. at 144-45. 
325 See Lisa Weighton & Patrick McCurdy, The Ghost in the News Room: The Legacy of 
Kenya’s 2007 Post-Election Violence and the Constraints on Journalists Covering Kenya’s 
2013 General Election, 11 J.E. AFR. STUD. 649, 662 (2017).  
326 Debra H. Swanson, “All We Are Saying is Give Peace a Chance”: A Sociological 
Response to Violence and Political Polarization, 50 SOC. FOCUS 291, 298 (2017).  
327 See generally Dov Waxman, A Dangerous Divide: The Deterioration of Jewish-
Palestinian Relations in Israel, 66 MIDDLE E.J. 11 (2012).  
328 See generally DONALD L. HOROWITZ, ETHNIC GROUPS IN CONFLICT (1985).  
329 See generally Reeve D. Vanneman & Thomas F. Pettigrew, Race and Relative 
Deprivation in the Urban United States, 13 RACE 461 (1972). 
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greater escalations in violence, largely due to growing levels of mutual 
mistrust, fear, and hostility. Political polarization along these lines, in turn, 
can increase narratives of exclusive or competitive victimhood—i.e., “my 
group has suffered more than anyone else’s”—and is linked to aggressive 
policies toward an outgroup.330 As a result, polarization in the social and 
historical context of a community makes it more likely that an audience will 
be receptive to speakers who incite hatred or violence.331  
Polarized communities are thus vulnerable to calls for seemingly 
justified collective violence. Inciting authority figures and politicians, for 
instance, often seek to amplify collective grievances and biases towards an 
outgroup, whose members are generally portrayed as being responsible to 
some degree for the ingroup’s travails.332 Communities are more sensitive to 
scapegoating an outgroup during periods of acute loss, displacement, or 
injustice in addition to heightened intergroup tensions over collective 
memories of social trauma or unresolved political injustices. For example, a 
famous study by Hovland showed that antiblack violence (including 
lynching) in the southern United States between 1882 and 1930 significantly 
and robustly correlated with poor economic conditions of perpetrator 
communities.333 Exploiting grievances, then, in a politically polarized 
environment along religious, ethnic or racial lines can easily stir up 
animosities toward an outgroup.  
 
4. The emotional state of the audience at the time of the speech 
appears heightened and predisposed towards violent activity. 
 
While outgroup aggression is often prompted by cognitive beliefs that 
one’s ingroup is threatened by a targeted outgroup, it is usually emotionally 
expressed as righteous indignation, such that the ingroup feels justified in 
“self-defense” against the outgroup.334 Remarkably, political ideologies that 
cultivate feelings of anger render groups more likely than others to 
 
330 Luca Andrighetto, Silvia Mari, Chiara Volpato & Burim Behluli, Reducing Competitive 
Victimhood in Kosovo: The Role of Extended Contact and Common Ingroup Identity, 33 
POL. PSYCHOL. 513, 513-14 (2012). 
331 Leader Maynard & Benesch, supra note 252, at 78. 
332See Herbert Blumer, Race Prejudice as a Sense of Group Position, 1 PAC. SOCIOL. REV. 
3, 6 (1958) (discussing the major influence authorities, social elites, and public figures have 
in shaping public discussions about group position and prejudice).  
333 See generally Carl Iver Hovland & Robert R. Sears, Minor Studies of Aggression: VI. 
Correlation of Lynchings with Economic Indices, 9 J. PSYCHOL 301 (1940) (discussing the 
correlation between experienced economic deprivation in communities of white perpetrators 
and mass violence against African Americans). 
334 George, supra note 288, at 158-59.  
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experience righteous indignation, thus suggesting the important role of a 
speaker in cultivating anger prior to the onset of a threat.335 Testing this 
hypothesis, Kuppens and colleagues undertook two studies in which groups 
were induced with anger, finding that anger indeed caused a spike in 
intergroup biases and hostilities—but only for outgroups that were portrayed 
as threatening.336 Hence, anger seems to indicate that some persons are more 
susceptible than others to channeling their frustrations into righteous 
indignation and possibly violent actions toward a threatening outgroup.  
 
D. Applying the Matrix: Sines v. Kessler 
 
This Section illustrates how the matrix for conducting a risk analysis 
of inciting speech can be applied to a concrete and recent case involving 
incitement to violence presently being adjudicated in the courts, in order to 
evaluate whether the framework could have predicted the eventual outcome. 
The case is Elizabeth Sines v. Jason Kessler, a civil suit filed against the 
organizers of a white supremacist rally in Charlottesville, Virginia on August 
11–12, 2017. The facts of the case are provided in the memorandum opinion 
issued on July 9, 2018 by District Judge Norman K. Moon allowing the suit to 
proceed, in which the court took all factual allegations in the complaint as true.337 
The central questions considered here are, could law enforcement 
agencies have anticipated that the organizers’ direct advocacy of violence on 
social media would lead to imminent lawless action, specifically to the injury 
of dozens of protestors and the death of one protestor, Heather Heyer? Could 
a systematic risk analysis conducted a priori have justified earlier 
intervention by the authorities, and therefore prevented the harms and 
fatality from occurring? 
Each of the ten factors in the matrix are reviewed in the light of the 
available evidence, to determine whether they were present before the white 
nationalists’ torchlit march on the evening of August 11, 2017. The evidence 
comes primarily from exchanges on social media and includes speech (for 




335 See Roni Porat, Eran Halperin & Maya Tamir, What We Want Is What We Get: Group-
Based Emotional Preferences and Conflict Resolution, 110 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 167, 168-69 (2016).  
336 Toon Kuppens, Thomas V. Pollet, Cátia Teixeira, Stéphanie Demoulin, S. Craig Roberts 
& Anthony C. Little, Emotions in Context: Anger Causes Ethnic Bias but Not Gender Bias 
in Men but Not Women, 42 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 432, 439-40 (2012).  
337 Sines v. Kessler, 324 F.Supp.3d 765, 774 (W.D. Va. 2018). 
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1. The speaker occupies an official position of authority within 
government or a political party or political movement. 
 
Present: The organizers of the march are leaders in the white 
nationalist or white supremacist or neo-Nazi movement, holding official 
positions of authority within their respective organizations. Defendants 
include the leader of the Traditionalist Worker Party,338 the two leaders of the 
League of the South,339leaders of the Nationalist Front, and the leader and 
“Commander” of the National Socialist Movement, a white supremacist 
organization with a paramilitary structure.340 
 
2. The speaker is perceived by supporters as credible or charismatic. 
 
Present: Defendant Richard Spencer has arguably the highest public 
profile of any white supremacist in America.341 Spencer is a new breed of 
media-friendly white supremacist, holding degrees from the Universities of 
Virginia and Chicago, and attired in expensive three-piece suits, gold 
cufflinks, and Swiss watches.342 He has single-handedly redefined white 
supremacist politics in the current era, and coined the euphemistic expression 
“alt-right.”343 He holds unparalleled sway in the white nationalist movement, 
illustrated by his ability to bring together at Charlottesville a number of 
disparate and sometimes antagonistic white nationalist groups. Spencer has a 
devoted following who see him as a fearless and charismatic leader who they 
venerate with chants of “Hail Spencer! Hail victory!”344 Defendant National 
Socialist Movement leader Jeff Shoep also commands the devotion of his 
followers, as expressed in online statements such as, “So much respect for 
my Commander Jeff Schoep. I will go into battle with you anytime Sir.”345 
 
3. The speaker has regular access to means of mass communication, 
or the ability to control information, or to suppress alternative 
sources of information. 
 
338 Id. at 775. 
339 Id. at 775-76.  
340 Id. at 776, 793. 
341 John Woodrow Cox, ‘Let’s Party Like It’s 1933’: Inside the Alt-Right World of Richard 





344 Sines v. Kessler, 324 F. Supp. 3d 765, 786 (W.D. Va. 2018) 
345 Id. at 793-94. 
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Present: Several defendants manage prominent websites or podcasts 
that reach a wide audience of white nationalists. Defendants Andrew Anglin 
and Robert Ray run the Daily Stormer website, and defendant Michael 
Peinovich hosts a podcast called the Daily Shoah.346 Defendants Kessler and 
Mosely coordinated the white nationalist march via a moderated social media 
platform called “Discord” that is widely used by white nationalists.347 Much 
of what the Court knows about the defendants’ conversations preceding the 
white nationalist rally comes from a record of the exchanges on Discord.348 
The Daily Stormer maintained a live feed of the events in Charlottesville, 
where viewers made comments such as “We have an army! This is the 
beginning of a war!”349 The fact pattern indicates that the organizers had more 
than just a few social media accounts; they were publishers of content on 
America’s leading white nationalist sites and had the ability to control 
information conveyed to their mass audience.350 
 
4. The message contains explicit or implicit calls for violent acts 
against members of an outgroup. 
 
Present: The conversation on Discord included planning details, racist 
“jokes,” and both explicit and implicit calls for violence against counter-
protestors. With respect to coded speech, we identified fake advertisements for 
a pepper spray that would kill African Americans “on contact”351 and 
questions about whether it was legal to run over protestors blocking a 
roadway.352 In response, one Discord user posted a picture of a bus running 
over protestors.353  
Other statements on social media explicitly called for or 
countenanced violence, such as “I’m ready to crack skulls,”354 references to 
marchers as “warriors,”355 and exhortations to bring weapons and to wear “a 
good fighting uniform.”356 Instructional videos posted on Discord showed 
how to fight in military formation and use shields.357 Members of Vanguard 
 
346 Id. at 775. 
347 Id. at 776. 
348 Id. 
349 Id. at 789. 
350 Id. at 784-95. 
351 Id. at 777. 
352 Id. at 796. 
353 Id. 
354 Id. at 784. 
355 Id. at 776. 
356 Id. at 786, 803. 
357 Id. at 790. 
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America discussed on social media which weapons they should bring, 
including firearms, batons and knives.358 Sines concludes that such 
statements went beyond mere advocacy of violence and included specific 
instructions to carry out violent acts.359 
Additionally, and more seriously, images of extreme violence and 
animus circulated on Discord in the run-up to the march, including a drawing 
of one defendant, Matthew Heimbach, with “kill tallies” of communists, the 
words “n- killer,” and an image of decapitated black men.360 The phrase “run 
them over” was popularized by websites such as the Daily Caller, on the 
mass-circulation service Fox Nation, and by the defendants on Discord.361  
 
5. The message dehumanizes an outgroup, expresses disgust for an 
outgroup, or calls for acts of revenge against an outgroup. 
 
Present: Posts on Discord used dehumanizing language to express 
extreme racial animus against African American and Jewish individuals,362 
with one Defendant telling a reporter that white nationalists “outnumbered 
the anti-white, anti-American filth.”363 Another Defendant called the counter-
protestors “savages.”364 Revenge speech was also present, although it came 
after the events and therefore does not contribute to the risk analysis. 
Defendant Kessler remarked on the intentional killing of protestor Heather 
Heyer, agreeing with the Loyal White Knights that she was a communist and 
adding that, “Communists have killed 94 million. Looks like it was payback 
time.”365 Another defendant stated after Heyer was killed, “[O]ur rivals are 
just a bunch of stupid animals.”366 
 
6. The message identifies a direct threat to the ingroup and identifies 
a clear and foreseeably violent course of action that can be taken 
by listeners imminently to remove the source of the threat. 
 
Present: White nationalist and supremacist groups have consistently 
portrayed white Christians as under threat of replacement by Jews.367 
 
358 Id. at 788. 
359 Id. at 803. 
360 Id. at 791. 
361 Id. at 796. 
362 Id. at 780. 
363 Id. at 789. 
364 Id. at 794. 
365 Id. at 796. 
366 Id. at 787. 
367 Id. at 785. 
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Defendant Eli Mosley of the Identity Evropa white supremacist organization 
led the marchers in the chant “Jews will not replace us.”368 Mosley declared 
that the defendants would not be replaced “without a fight.”369 Therefore, 
organizers of the march identified Jews as a threat to their livelihoods, and 
encouraged their followers to engage in a torchlit march in which they would 
fight, literally and figuratively, to remove the threat.  
 
7. There is a history of intergroup conflict between the ingroup and 
outgroup, and the number of instances of intergroup violence has 
increased overall in the previous twelve months. 
 
Present: As seen in the introduction to this Article, after a decade of 
decline, documented hate crimes increased sharply in 2016 and 2017, 
indicating a general climate of heightened conflict between white nationalists 
(ingroup) and nonwhites (outgroup) in the United States.370 If we focus more 
specifically on the actions of white nationalist organizations, earlier in 2017, 
white nationalist groups clashed with protestors in Berkeley, California over 
the course of several months.371 A number defendants at Charlottesville 
participated in the Berkeley skirmishes and one of them, Identity Evropa founder 
Nathan Damigo, referred to Berkeley as a “test run” for Charlottesville.372 
 
8. There is a major national political election in the next twelve 
months or there was a major national political election in the last 
twelve months.  
 
Present: One of the most contentious national elections in the country’s 
history took place only nine months prior to the August 2017 conflict. Defendant 
Matthew Heimbach, secretary of the white supremacist Traditionalist Workers’ 
Party and an organizer of the Charlottesville march, maintained an active and 
violent presence at Trump presidential election rallies and pled guilty to 
disorderly conduct after assaulting protestors at a Trump rally in Louisville, 
Kentucky in 2016.373  
 
368 Id. 
369 Id. at 790. 
370 See supra notes 8-13 and accompanying text. 
371 Natasha Lennard, The Violent Clashes in Berkeley Weren’t ‘Pro-Trump’ Versus ‘Anti-
Trump’, ESQUIRE (April 16, 2017), https://www.esquire.com/news-politics/news/a54564/the-
violent-clashes-in-berkeley-werent-pro-trump-versus-anti-trump/ [https://perma.cc/EC7H MMAA]. 
372 Sines, 324 F. Supp. 3d at 790. 
373 Thomas Novelly & Matthew Glowicki, White Nationalist Pleads Guilty to Disorderly 
Conduct at Trump Rally, COURIER J. (Louisville) (July 19, 2017), https://www.courier-
journal.com/story/news/crime/2017/07/19/white-nationalist-pleads-guilty-harassment-charge-
trump-rally/492219001/ [https://perma.cc/TB4B-X6UP]. 
Vol. 5:2] Incitement in an Era of Populism  
 
 




9. There is significant polarization of political organizations along 
religious, ethnic, or racial lines. 
 
Present: White nationalist and white supremacist organizations are by 
definition polarized along ethnic, racial or religious lines, according to the 
ideology of these groups, which either seek white dominance or a white ethno-
nationalist state.374 Defendant National Socialist Movement openly espouses a 
neo-Nazi ideology,375 and defendant Richard Spencer advocates a “peaceful 
ethnic cleansing” that would remove all non-whites from American soil.376 
 
10. The emotional state of the audience at the time of the message 
appears heightened and predisposed towards violent activity. 
 
Present: The chorus of approval of violence on social media before 
the march had identifiable effects on the emotional state of the white 
nationalist marchers. Defendant Cantwell said to a reporter before the march 
that he was “trying to make [himself] more capable of violence.”377 When 
asked by a reporter if he was armed, Cantwell produced two semi-automatic 
rifles, three handguns, and a knife.378 The emotional state of white 
nationalist marchers appears to have been heightened in the pre-march 
planning phase, as they were instructed to enter Emancipation Park in 
military formations, some carrying pre-made banners with statements such 
as, “Gas the k---s, race war now!”379 They shouted antisemitic slogans as 
they passed a synagogue.380 At the torchlit march on August 11, white 
nationalists gave Nazi salutes, chanted “Blood and Soil,” and made monkey 
sounds at the protestors.381 
 
374 See Amanda Taub, ‘White Nationalism,’ Explained, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/22/world/americas/white-nationalism-explained.html 
[https://perma.cc/RS7Z-PUGA] (describing how white nationalists seek the dominance of 
white people); White Nationalist, S. POVERTY L. CTR., https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-
hate/extremist-files/ideology/white-nationalist [https://perma.cc/BL7V-3BMK] (last visited Jan. 
28, 2019) (reviewing the ideology of white nationalist groups in America). 
375 See Neo-Nazi, S. POVERTY L. CTR., https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-
files/ideology/neo-nazi [https://perma.cc/HX7L-BS89] (reviewing the ideology of the National 
Socialist Movement). 
376 Taub, supra note 373. 
377 Sines, 324 F. Supp. 3d at 786. 
378 Id. at 796. 
379 Id. at 779. 
380 Id. 
381 Id. at 785. 
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In summary, ten of the ten risk factors were present before the events 
in Charlottesville on August 11 and 12, 2017, indicating that imminent 
violence was highly likely. As we now know, the defendants’ speech and 
other acts did culminate in actual violence. Dozens of assaults occurred on 
August 11, and one protestor, Heather Heyer, was killed on August 12, when 
defendant James Fields drove his car into a crowd of peaceful protestors.382 
Sines maintains that the statements on Discord indicate the defendants were 
involved in a conspiracy to commit racial violence383 and that the violence 
was “reasonably foreseeable,” citing as evidence the inciting speech on 
Discord and other white nationalist sites, the instructions to bring lethal 




Drawing on behavioral and humanistic research, this Article provides 
an urgently needed framework to determine whether lawless action is 
imminent and likely to result from inciting speech. This ten-factor matrix is 
of course open to revision as our knowledge improves. Skeptics may ask, 
“why should we rely on social science when it’s always developing and 
changing and there never seems to be unqualified certainty?” The obvious 
reply is that legal procedure and doctrine is always developing and changing 
too, and may at times lack certainty, as our review of First Amendment law 
demonstrates. Evidently, both law and social research are moving targets. 
They transform as societal norms shift and as our knowledge improves. It 
behooves courts to ensure that they are adequately informed, which 
necessarily brings law and science into dialogue with each other. 
Given that federal and state prosecutors exercise wide discretion in 
charging defendants for incitement, a more transparent risk assessment 
framework is not in itself sufficient to transform incitement law, although it 
is a necessary component of any reform. Here, it should be noted that legal 
change often occurs through strategic litigation brought by pressure groups. 
First Amendment law applies equally to criminal prosecution and to civil 
litigation, and in each setting, the question is the same: “is this speech 
constitutionally protected?” Now we have a framework for approaching that 
question in a way that relies less on hunches and heuristics than empirically 
based findings in historical, social science, and behavioral research. 
  
 
382 Id. at 778-79. 
383 Id. at 799. 
384 Id. at 795-96. 
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APPENDIX: THE INCITEMENT MATRIX 
 
1. The speaker occupies an official position of authority within 
government or a political party or political movement. 
2. The speaker is perceived by supporters as credible or charismatic. 
3. The speaker has regular access to means of mass communication, or 
the ability to control information, or to suppress alternative sources of 
information. 
4. The message contains explicit or implicit calls for violent acts against 
members of an outgroup. 
5. The message dehumanizes an outgroup, or expresses disgust for an 
outgroup, or calls for acts of revenge against an outgroup. 
6. The message identifies a direct threat to the ingroup and identifies a 
clear and foreseeably violent course of action that can be taken by 
listeners imminently to remove the source of the threat. 
7. There is a history of intergroup conflict between the ingroup and 
outgroup, and the number of instances of intergroup violence has 
increased overall in the previous twelve months. 
8. There is a major national political election in the next twelve months or 
there was a major national political election in the last twelve months. 
9. There is significant polarization of political parties along religious, 
ethnic, or racial lines. 
10. The emotional state of the audience at the time of the message appears 
heightened and predisposed towards violent activity. 
 
